Neurolaw: A New Approach to Normativity based on Teleology
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Abstract:
The evolving field of neurolaw raises critical questions about the intersection of neuroscience and legal justice, particularly in assessing criminal responsibility and ethical considerations. This paper explores the implications of neurolaw through the lens of Sheppard v. Davis (2020), a case highlighting the role of mental illness in legal culpability. Despite extensive psychiatric evaluations revealing severe mental health conditions, Sheppard was sentenced to capital punishment, illustrating the limitations of the current legal framework in considering neuroscientific evidence. This paper argues that integrating neurolaw into U.S. courts is essential for fostering a fair, equitable, and just legal system—one that acknowledges the complex relationship between brain function and criminal behavior. However, such integration must be carefully managed to avoid ethical pitfalls, such as eroding moral agency or establishing problematic legal precedents. Drawing on John Rawls’ distinction between rationality and reasonableness, this paper contends that a teleological shift toward rehabilitation, rather than mere punishment, is necessary for an improved legal framework. Ultimately, neurolaw presents a transformative opportunity to align legal practices with contemporary understandings of human cognition, ensuring a justice system that is both principled and humane.
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When considering the teleology of today’s legal sector, the overall aim, in a most general sense, has been ensuring justice and societal well-being; however, the development and implementation of neurolaw, the attempt at understanding the relationship between law and the brain, has raised the question of what is legal justice when taking into account new neuroscientific research (Petoft, 2015). Neurolaw is asking questions related to how one’s brain may influence criminal responsibility, play into mental health law, introduce new possible realms of tort law, or affect free will in legal contexts (Petoft, 2015). For the sake of this essay, a case, Sheppard v. Davis (5th Cir. 2020), will be used to break down neurolaw’s new teleological legal structure of normativity. The breakdown of this case will hone in on what neurolaw could mean for both mentally ill offenders of the law moving forward, as well as the US population writ large with regard to contemporary ethics. As a result of this analysis concerning Sheppard v. Davis, it is contended that the further development and usage of neurolaw within US courts is crucial towards reaching the most fair, equitable and just legal system possible; however, it is just as, if not more crucial, that this implementation of neurolaw within US courts abide by a very fine line to avoid negative ethical ramifications affecting the US population as a whole.
To begin, it is necessary to first break down the case of Sheppard v. Davis. At age 19, Erica Sheppard assisted another individual (person P) in the murder of a mother with two children (person M). Sheppard, after first breaking into M's apartment, proceeded to tackle and hold down M and watched as P cut her to death (Sheppard v. Davis, 2020). Unarguably, the crime appears worthy of capital punishment, which is what Sheppard received; however, it remains necessary to understand the mental state of Sheppard prior to, and when committing these acts, regardless of how gruesome the crime may have been.
After the crime, Sheppard was evaluated by multiple psychiatrists. Following two specific psychiatric evaluations — one being a twelve, and the other an eighteen hour evaluation — there were significant findings on Sheppard’s mental state. It was determined that Sheppard suffered from severe Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, and dissociative disorder; she was found to have the mental-age equivalence of a fourteen year old, likely only able to respond to stimulus in a non-thinking manner rather than as a reasonable adult (Sheppard v. Davis, 2020). It follows that Sheppard would be extremely vulnerable to manipulation. Growing up, it is also relevant to note that Sheppard was subject to being almost beaten to death by her mother, forced to perform oral sex repeatedly between 3-5 years old, faced domestic abuse, admitted to hearing voices in her head, and was raped numerous times, once even at knifepoint (Sheppard v. Davis, 2020).
Now, it must be said that while gaining an understanding of Sheppard's background ought not relieve her of criminal responsibility entirely, it is crucial when determining the correct punishment for rehabilitation purposes here. That is, her background under these circumstances is entirely relevant towards reaching the most fair, equitable and just punishment possible; thereby, it is also relevant towards reaching the most fair, equitable and just legal system. To understand the role of neurolaw on fairness, equity and justice, per their varying definitions and usages in today’s world, it is important to first understand the meaning of these terms as used in this essay. For a legal system to be fair, it will take into account/consider all things needed to have an equitable legal system. As for an equitable legal system, it is one that goes beyond giving everyone the same opportunity; it ensures equal chance for an equal outcome for all. The difference here between fair and equitable is that pure fairness merely adopts principles of what it means to be equitable, but an equitable legal system ensures its equity. Lastly, legal justice is reached when, and only when, a legal system is both fair and equitable, ensuring holistic review for every case presented before it. The ways in which these qualities are enhanced by the implementation of neurolaw within US courts and their impact on future offenders will now be expanded upon.
When considering how neurolaw ensures a more fair legal system, we must circle back to Sheppard’s case. Here, we are looking largely at principle; that is, what the principles of her case are that influenced the ultimate decision of her execution, and how these principles would have differed per neurolaw’s influence. When deciding to deny Sheppard’s appeals and to carry out her execution, the court stated all of the evidence regarding Sheppard’s mental state was “merely cumulative,” meaning it was an unnecessary amount of evidence pointing towards one conclusion (Sheppard v. Davis, 2020). Simply put, the findings regarding Sheppard’s mental state were not viewed as necessary to take into consideration by the court, as the conclusion was seemingly obvious. This, however, is not a fair principle; the evidence here was not cumulative insofar as the true extent to which Sheppard experienced mental illness was never actually determined. For if the evidence were indeed cumulative, Sheppard would not have been executed per the sake of rehabilitation; it would not be impossible to rehabilitate Sheppard with reasonable precautions in as much as her mental state influenced her actions. Cumulative documents in this case would have demonstrated just how poor and unstable her mental condition truly was. All of this evidence should have been taken into consideration. The need to consider evidence regarding the relationship between law and one’s brain must be principally established for a fair legal system to exist. Thus, the role of neurolaw in ensuring this relationship is adequately considered will undeniably produce a more fair consideration of the why, both within Sheppard’s, as well as other offenders’ cases moving forward.
Concerning equity, the principles necessary for fairness must be enforced in a way such that each individual has an equal chance at the same outcome. In this case, once understanding neurolaw’s primary principle — adequately examining the relationship between one’s brain and the law — one must now ascertain how this principle can be used and enforced to create the most equitable legal system. When answering this question, one must specifically determine the weight of mental health disability on criminal and civil guilt/liability to perceive how to properly implement neurolaw’s key principle with respect to rehabilitation purposes. To this end, the teleology of the neurolaw’s new legal structure of normativity is, and must be rehabilitation. That is, neurolaw aims to no longer focus on justice or societal well-being as its ends; rather, it factors in questions of justice and societal well-being in deciding on rehabilitation strategies for the individual. Rehabilitation is neurolaw’s end. One must then ask when dealing with mental illness on criminal and civil guilt/liability what the best way to rehabilitate an individual is with resources available. Neurolaw thus presents as a tool that does not get side tracked when dealing with mental illness on how gruesome a crime may be. While Sheppard’s crime was gruesome, one’s focus must remain on rehabilitating her, not merely punishing her per society’s influence. This is the aim of fairness neurolaw promises for all, thereby establishing additional means of equitable practice. Accordingly, neurolaw is necessary to the enforcement of an equitable legal system.
In combination with both the more fair and more equitable legal systems possible through the implementation and usage of neurolaw, we arrive at the conclusion that neurolaw will ultimately produce a more just legal system per the definition of justice. As mentioned prior, this implementation, however, must follow a very fine line. This line will now be our focus.
When distinguishing the acceptable line of neurolaw’s influence, there are specific questions that arise. Largely, questions transpire regarding what neurolaw may mean for the US population at large. That is, how might one remain a moral agent if, in time, neurolaw develops a new, universally accepted standard concerning one’s behavior and mental illness? This line of questioning directly leads into neurolaw’s influence on contemporary ethical theories. That is, for instance, what could neurolaw mean for moral absolutes, or per deontological ethical theories, moral obligations that cannot be overridden. Might neurolaw set a benchmark that there are no moral absolutes if the courts weigh one’s mental health too highly? Will it be found that one cannot be responsible for their actions as a result of mental illness? Or could it be that neurolaw sets an infinite amount of moral absolutes by distinguishing one normative “neurological correctness” with regard to the brain and one’s actions? Will there still be a need for contemporary ethical theories as a result of neurolaw’s findings/usage? It is clear that there are many questions left unanswered regarding the scope of neurolaw and its role in one’s acting as a moral agent, many of which hold the power to give rise to significant negative consequences for the US population at large; however, the governing line of neurolaw is reachable.
To understand this line it is necessary to look towards political philosopher John Rawls. In his book Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls makes the distinction between what is rational and what is reasonable. In this distinction, Rawls states that to be rational is to behave sensibly or understandably; comparably, to behave reasonably is to behave in a manner that is morally justified, fair, intrinsically just, and to the benefit of the public (Rawls & Kelly, 2003). For instance, an individual who robs a gas station is behaving rationally, as one may be able to understand why he robbed a gas station; however, this act is not reasonable, as the robber’s behavior is not morally justifiable. Concerning neurolaw, Rawl’s theory will draw the governing line based on reasonableness. While one can rationalize the vast possibilities of neurolaw, by acting in such a way that Rawls distinguishes as reasonable, one is forced to act both in the best interest of the US public, and for the sake of morality qua morality. One is thus ethically not permitted to adopt a teleological structure of normativity based on ends; one is not permitted to adopt a system like the one that executed Erica Sheppard. This system, as was previously uncovered, is not as fair, equitable, or as just as it necessarily should have been. Because there has demonstrably been a possibility of a more fair, equitable and just legal system, reason will inevitably guide one to reaching the described system of proper usage. Reasonableness thus demonstrably promises neurolaw’s ideal structure of normativity based on a teleology of rehabilitation.
As a result of the reflection of neurolaw’s influence, it is clear that once uncovering, grasping, and ensuring the governing line of reasonableness as per Rawls, neurolaw promises a more fair, equitable and just normative legal structure based on teleology. Insofar as this new normative structure’s teleology moves away from usings means, such as justice and societal well-being, as misleading end goals, it can center in on rehabilitation as its true end. This shift both inevitably and undeniably promises a better outcome for offenders, such as Erica Sheppard, as well as the US population as a whole. It ensures a moral compass based on the betterment and growth of both its society and its offenders. Accordingly, neurolaw’s necessity has been demonstrated.
References
Petoft A. (2015). Neurolaw: A brief introduction. Iranian journal of neurology, 14(1), 53–58.
Rawls, J., & Kelly, E. (2003). Justice as fairness: A restatement. WRMS.
Sheppard v. Davis, no. 18-70011 (5th cir. 2020). Justia Law. (n.d.). https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/18-70011/18-70011-2020-07-22.html
Fall 2024 Semester Portfolio
Included are three essays written this semester which I believe both demonstrate my individual philosophical growth and are relevant to modern philosophical questions
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Ancient Greek Philosopher Epicurus, when it comes to decision making, claims it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way in his Letter to Menoeceus. However, this is inconsistent with his subscription to katastematic hedonism. This contradiction as a result of his claim on fate is analyzed within the the text.
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Protagoras’ Man is the Measure Doctrine states that man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not. This doctine’s possible meanings are explored, specifically with regards to human knowledge, within Plato’s Theaetetus.
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As the title hints, this essay attempts to answers the question of whether or not one should, or should not fear death. Through a variety of readings and authors, the position is taken that one ought not live in fear of death, as one cannot come to know death itself prior to dying.
Epicurus On Fate: Decision Making and Katastematic Pleasure
In Diogenes Laertius’ preservation of Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus, on the notion of fate, claims it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way. That is, it is better for a favorable decision not to turn out right in action than for a poor/careless decision to turn out right because of chance, or unintentionally (Inwood & Gerson 31). Going forward within this essay, it is necessary to understand the ideas of eudaimonia and katastematic pleasure. Eudaimonia will be defined as the general characterization of the highest good. On the other hand, katastematic pleasure is a form of pleasure in which there is a persistent and undifferentiated state; this state includes feelings of tranquillity, the absence of want or unsatisfied desire, and resistance to pain and anxiety; it can be contrasted with kinetic pleasure, or strictly physiological pleasure based upon movement/change. Epicurus and the Epicureans held that katastematic pleasure is the way of achieving eudaimonia, or the highest good. When considering the Epicurean viewpoint that eudaimonia is a life of sustained katastematic pleasure, there is disagreement stemming from Epicurus’ claim on fate. Specifically, if one is to only seek out katastematic pleasure to reach eudaimonia, it is unclear as to why one would not embrace the poor or careless act or decision if it leads to more pleasure, regardless of if it is by chance. It is thus both inconsistent and incompatible for Epicurus to claim that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way while also subscribing to katastematic hedonism — a life in search solely of katastematic pleasure. This inconsistency/incompatibility takes the shape of making the Epicureans’ consequentialist form of ethics — where what is ethical is concomitant to katastematic pleasure — objectivist — where the outcome is irrelevant and one must always pick the good act regardless of outcome.
To begin, it is necessary to break down and understand Epricurus’ claim on fate. Within his Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus is writing to Menoeoceus to provide practices which lead towards living the good life, or towards reaching eudaimonia. These practices include having devout feelings towards the gods, having no fear regarding death, having reasoned out the natural goal of life, calculating the reasons for and against each choice, and knowing the limits of both good and bad things. When breaking each of these practices down, there are two things worth noting. First, Epicurus is not focused on these acts in themselves. That is, Epicurus is not concerned with the gods qua the gods, or death qua death; rather, Epicurus is only concerned with the gods or death inasmuch as their concern leads towards reaching eudaimonia — he is concerned with the outcome of being concerned. Second, all of these acts center around the individual. Specifically, each individual must have a relationship with the gods or not fear death for the impact that is to be had on them only. These practices laid out by Epicurus leave each individual capable of being their own rational agent; it allows the individual to develop their own reasoning as to why having a relationship with the gods will fill their life with katastematic pleasure.
Now, before ending the letter, Epicurus brings up the idea of fate. Particularly, Epicurus asserts that one ought to refrain from becoming a slave to fate, and must seek to remain autonomous (Inwood & Gerson 31). Epicurus follows this with his claim on fate: that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way. To understand this claim, it is necessary to circle back to the practices Epicurus mentions in order to reach eudaimonia. For instance, recall his assertion of the necessity of having a relationship with the gods. By the fate claim, Epicurus believes it is better for one to rationally seek a relationship with the gods for its foreseeable and anticipated pleasure, and in the end, find no pleasure, than to not develop a relationship with the gods, and on the off chance, experience pleasure. It seems to Epicurus that by following this practice, one is thus foreseeably more likely to reach eudaimonia through rational calculation, and accordingly, it is compatible with and the best way of practicing katastematic hedonism in order to reach eudaimonia.
Specifically, in terms of ethically good and bad acts, Epicurus is attempting to say that choosing the bad act — if the outcome of both the good and the bad act are unknown — is wrong, insofar as it is not foreseeably as likely to produce a katastematicly pleasurable outcome proportional to the good act. In this sense, an Epicurean would assert that the fate claim is compatible with the Epicurean subscription to katastematic hedonism because the ethical/good act is always assumed to bring the most pleasure; that is, Epicurus’ claim on fate is still a form of consequentialist ethics as the good act is only as good as its pleasurable outcome.
While Epicurus’ claim on fate may seem reasonable at first glance, it nevertheless gives room to the rise of an ethical incompatibility. Particularly, it gives rise to an objective ethical principle within the midst of a necessarily consequentialist form of katastematic hedonism. To develop an understanding of why this is, it is necessary to define objective vs. consequential ethics, as well as hedonism. Objective ethics provide a moral guideline through principles; that is, it is always wrong to kill, or it is always wrong to lie. Consequential ethics concern the agent with the consequence of each action. For instance, it is okay to kill Jane if Jane is planning to kill five other people, or it is okay for Jane to lie if it will help save the lives of three people in danger. Hedonism, on the other hand, is the belief that pleasure is the first innate good. Thus, a hedonist may develop a moral compass in search of what brings them pleasure; that is, an act is virtuous for the hedonist insofar as it has an outcome of pleasure. For this reason, as hedonism is focused on the outcome of an act rather than a basic principle, it is the root of a consequential form of ethics.
Recalling the practices Epicurus describes for Menoeceus to achieve eudaimonia, these acts are good to the extent that they provide the agent with a form of pleasure as a result of performing them; they are focused on the sole value of pleasure, thereby hedonistic, and are good, ethical, and virtuous due to their outcome, so by that, consequentialist as well. Now, as for Epicurus’ fate claim — that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way — it can be broken down into two objective ethical principles. First, one must act as a rational agent; and second, one must always choose the act that appears more rational as a result of their being a rational agent. Because one can break this claim down into objective principles that entirely lack concern for the outcome of each action, it is ethically objective and is no different than saying, for example, one must never kill. Therefore, in this case, an act is better ethically if the outcome is not pleasurable so long as one acted rationally per Epicurus. However, this goes entirely against Epicurean consequentialism, and as a result, becomes the antithesis of katastematic hedonism.
To now put this ethical incompatibility into perspective, consider the example of a social justice advocate. By speaking out on issues important to this advocate, they will foreseeably receive a lifetime of katastematic pleasure, and thus by katastematic hedonism, this behavior is entirely ethical. Now, as a result of speaking up, consider a scenario where this individual is imprisoned, or even worse, killed; however, being imprisoned or killed will inevitably cause this advocate unforeseen suffering, as they are no longer able to spread awareness on the issues that are important to them. Per Epicurus’ claim on fate, it is better for the advocate to be imprisoned or dead, being the unlucky result of a good action, than to have abstained from this behavior and experienced more pleasure in the long run; meanwhile, however, the overarching goal of the Epicurean is to experience as much katastematic pleasure as possible. Thus, the fate claim is advocating entirely against katastematic hedonism; it is advocating for short-term pleasure, if advocating for any pleasure at all. This is why the objective nature of Epicurus’ fate claim is simply incompatible ethically with Epicurean hedonism; there are two conflicting guidelines to follow when seeking to act virtuously.
Once understanding how Epicurus’ claim on fate creates an ethical incompatibility, it is necessary to further challenge and develop the ways in which the claim on fate is antithetical to Epicurean hedonism. The argument against Epicurus and the Epicureans will now be laid out. If an individual has both option P and option Q, where P is the “good” act and Q is the “bad” act, it seems on the surface level that one should, without hesitation, choose option P for its anticipated pleasure. This, alongside the Epicurean, is agreed upon. However, if it happens once that an individual chooses option Q, and this action ends up leading to its own katastematic pleasure, it would seem compatible with the Epicurean belief in obtaining eudaimonia that when left to fate, the bad act may not always be wrong to choose inasmuch as it has once provided a sense of pleasure. It would then still be inconsistent with katastematic hedonism to objectively claim it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way, if being lucky has previously resulted in more katastematic pleasure.
On these grounds, the Epicurean must respond that if Q, the bad act, becomes foreseeably more pleasurable than P, the good act, then Q becomes the good act, and P the bad act, and it is thus still compatible with katastematic hedonism to always choose the good act when left to fate. Yet, to the Epicureans it must be said that if in time the bad act can become the good act, then it is even less reasonable to always choose P knowing that Q can — and has for that matter — as a result of time, become the good act itself. It is on these grounds foolish by Epicurus’ claim to choose either act to the extent that in this case both P and Q are left to chance due to their possible shift in “goodness.” Accordingly, the fate claim remains incompatible with katastematic hedonism because it would mean always choosing P, when always choosping P would mean missing out on pleasure once — not if but when — the bad act becomes the good act.
Backing Epicurus, one must respond that it is impossible for Q to become the good act insofar as no one will experience Q, as they will always choose P in accordance with Epicurus’ claim on fate, and accordingly, Q would never become the good act in the first place. However, in response to this, not one Epicurean has to experience Q themself to find pleasure more foreseeable in Q. Consider an individual who has been eating bread everyday to satisfy their hunger. Now, consider an instance where this individual watches someone else who had eaten bread everyday too, eat steak, and proceed to rave about how good the steak was afterwards. In this instance, that individual who had eaten bread everyday may have their desire for steak sparked due to a newfound foreseeable pleasure, in the same sense that one who watches another find pleasure in Q, the opposite of P, may then have a rational temptation towards Q themself without ever having experienced it. By continuing to choose P, the “good” choice, in this instance, it will lead to the opposite of katastematic pleasure. Consider a second example in which an Epicurean living in a community with other Epicureans trips and breaks their arm. As a result, the Epicurean is told not to do their daily chores for the community and to get rest. Another Epicurean witnesses this situation and sees the result of the first Epicurean. Would it not seem reasonable for this second Epicurean — assuming they want to get out of their daily work too — to try and break their arm — act Q — for the foreseeable katastematic pleasure resulting from not doing their chores? It is clear that one does not need to experience Q themself to foresee pleasure in Q; and now, with the desire of Q unfilled, they can no longer find katastematic pleasure in P. Epicurus’ claim that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way thereby remains incompatible with the Epicurean belief in katastematic hedonism being the truest form of eudaimonia, as one who follows this claim limits their reasonable search of the greatest form of katastematic pleasures.
At best, by following Epicurus’ fate claim, one can be said to develop a sense of objective consequentialism. That is, they are focused on an objectively probable cause: by choosing P, the good act, they are objectively more probable to receive katastematic pleasure (Sinnott- Armstrong). However, this still necessarily takes away from the particular individual’s ability to foresee their own pleasure in outcomes, doing away with the true subjective form of consequentialism that is fundamental to katastematic hedonism — as not everyone receives the same pleasure from the same things. By taking away the subjective nature of consequentialism in the case of the Epicureans, it also takes away their ability to be a rational agent, as they are unable to think in terms of pleasure for themselves, but only through an objective sense; thus, by the objective consequentialism stemming from Epicurus’ claim on fate, one is left with the option of being either unlucky or lucky, both in an irrational way, making it absurd not to seek out being lucky, and thus pleasurable. In the end, regardless of the way one approaches Epicurus’ claim that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way, it remains the antithesis of the Epicureans’ way of obtaining eudaimonia as a result of its concomitant ethical incompatibility.
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Protagoras’ Man is the Measure Doctrine: The Truth of Knowledge
In Plato’s Theaetetus, Theaetetus claims that knowledge is perception. Socrates takes this assertion to mean that, if Theaetetus’ claim is true, Protagoras’ man is the measure doctrine is correct; namely, that man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not (152a, Plato, Complete Works). While Socrates applies this doctrine to the assertion that knowledge is perception, it is inappropriate not to question whether this is the meaning Protagoras had in mind. Accordingly, there are two additional interpretations one should consider. First, Protagoras may have meant that what man is, is simply a measure against what man is not (interpretation §1). That is, by comparing what one is to what one is not, one can know what they are as they know what they are not – i.e. what is, is, simply because it is not something else. Secondly and more convincingly, however, it appears Protagoras could be implying all knowledge is synthetic, or created by humans themselves (interpretation §2). While this interpretation appears to claim knowledge is perception in a different form, what is meant is that humans are using their own creations – their language, their cultures, etc. – to interpret or to perceive, such that without their own creations, there could be no knowledge. One’s interpretations therefore lie in a synthetic, man-made foundation equipping individuals with the ability to interpret and thus, to know. As such, the way society uses these tools allows individuals to create, or know what is, thus becoming their own measure. If this latter interpretation of Protagoras’ ‘man is the measure doctrine’ is correct, knowledge is nothing more than a social construct. That is, knowledge could not truly exist outside of one’s own idea of knowledge, as knowledge would only be obtainable through synthetic means and not reachable through the natural world itself.
Now, within the Theaetetus, the overarching goal of the dialogue is to understand and determine what knowledge is. Within Theaetetus and Socrates’ conversation, they arrive at the definition of knowledge as perception, ultimately subscribing to Protagoras’ man as the measure doctrine to back their claim. The belief in favor of this doctrine is as follows: because everyone experiences things differently, such as the temperature in a room, everyone has their own individual truths. These truths are incontrovertible; one cannot argue or be argued with whether they felt cold or hot. Thus, absolute truth is contingent only upon the observer’s interpretations, becoming the measure of themselves and the world as they know it. For Socrates and Theaetetus, this doctrine, as well as the claim that knowledge is perception, follows the idea of subjective relativism, or the idea that all facts are true for an individual and only one individual. Accordingly, if something is true perceptually, it must be considered knowledge.
As the approach taken by Thaetetus and Socrates on the interpretation of the man is the measure doctrine is now clear, its approach concerning §1 and §2 requires further exploration. For the purposes of this essay, there are three components to be fulfilled when examining the doctrine. First, one must be a/the measure in any interpretation of the doctrine. Second, one must be able to determine what is and what is not, and third, there must exist one’s actual knowledge of what is and what is not. In order for §1 and §2 to appear correct, these components must be fulfilled.
When initially approaching §1, it can be shown to meet the mentioned prongs for correct interpretation of the doctrine. That is, one is provided the ability to determine what is and what is not, through the method of taking what they are not away from what they are (satisfying prong two). Once performing this subtraction of oneself from oneself, one is left with knowing what is, namely, what they are (satisfying prong three). Now, it should be said that what one is, is what makes up one’s life as they know it. For instance, one is a doctor, a parent, or a family member. These things can be broken down further, such as into an oncologist, a father, or a cousin, respectively; and these can be broken down again, perhaps into a pediatric surgical oncologist, a father of three, or a cousin of Jim, for example. Once one knows what they are on a larger scale – from taking away what they are not from what they are – they can continue to break down these components to understand what is on a smaller scale. If we continue to break down the oncologist, we may arrive at the point of an individual who surgically removes masses of cells whose cell cycle checkpoints no longer stop cell division, causing them to multiply uncontrollably. Now, how do we know that a cell cycle checkpoint is, one might respond. We know that a cell cycle is, because it is what the doctor is. Thus, man becomes not only a measure of themselves, but of everything that is, originating in understanding what one is from looking at what they are not – entirely from §1. As man has been shown to be a/the measure as a result of §1, it has met all three prongs in order to become a plausible interpretation of the doctrine.
Looking now at §2, it too can be shown to meet all three prongs laid out. To distinguish between what is and what is not, one uses the tools – i.e. their language, culture, etc. – they have been provided with that have been created by others. Consider two people; let one of them be part of a contemporary society such as ours today (P1), and the other to have been secluded from society, having never had anyone around them but themself (P2). Consider a scenario where both of these individuals are walking through a forest. As P1 walks through, they are able to distinguish what is from what is not, while P2 cannot do so, though they are seeing the same things. If they continue to walk through the forest each day, while in time P2 would begin to observe the different shapes, sizes, or colors of the things in the forest around them, they have no reason to conclude anything is different from anything else, or that everything is not one. Thus, it is not until human creation, such as a language, shared culture, or shared belief comes into play that one is able to distinguish what is from what is not, or in this case, what is many from what is one, producing what today we would call knowledge. Therefore, P2 could walk through the forest everyday for the entirety of their life and find no such thing as what we would call knowledge in the natural world; for knowledge is simply what one calls using these human-created tools in a specific way – a way to distinguish what is from what is not – such that without them, P2 can never hold knowledge.
As humans have a way to determine what is as a result of their creations, they too know as a result of them. That is, P1 knows the differences of the trees from the bushes not because they have an innate idea that they are not the same thing outside of their appearance, but because humans have begun to call them different things. They know, as that is what their language says is the case; because of attaching their symbol, or meaning, to an object; and because of the way in which their culture uses these languages/symbols to guide them to what they believe to be knowledgeable or true in the world around them.
Take now into account that of numbers and mathematics – something which one may often claim to be an innate form of knowledge. Recall P2 and their experience walking through the forest. It is important to first note that P2 would have no reason to call two adjacent trees by the number 2, as 2 is simply a symbol we use to illustrate the idea of ‘two,’ which they would not know. Accordingly, these man-made symbols, such as language and numbers can be said to influence the way one thinks. Without knowing these numeric symbols, P2 would have no reason to think in terms of the number of trees they see; there would be no innate force driving P2 to distinguish whether or not the two trees they saw were one or many. Thus, while mathematics appears to be a form of incontrovertibly true and innate knowledge, it is rooted in man-made symbols that influence the way one interprets and thinks of the world around them.
As children are raised from a young age to think dichotomously – for instance, in terms of 1 or 2 or 3, or of one or many – they are being raised to think in terms of society’s idea of knowledge; thus, it must be said that our knowledge is simply a form of social dogma – a socially constructed absolute. One free from this dogma, however, cannot be said to hold its knowledge. Therefore, P2, free from these man-made symbols and languages, must not have knowledge as we know it. On the other hand, though, one who holds these synthetic tools of distinction – of which allow man to become a/the measure of themselves and the world – must be said to have some form of knowledge of what is and what is not, satisfying both prongs one and three of a correct interpretation of the doctrine.
Though both interpretations have been shown to meet the three criteria for correct interpretation, it is necessary to look at potential flaws. Two points are presented for consideration. First, §1 presupposes that one is able to distinguish what something/someone is not; however, individuals' realities may become mixed with their desires. That is, one’s desire to be wise may influence them to believe they are wise. As this is left up to the individual's pure, reason-based assessment, it appears flawed, leading man to be an inaccurate measure. Consequently, it appears one must subscribe to §2. Secondly, however, many people will say that §2 is wrong because humans cannot make up knowledge surrounding things so small such as, for example, atoms or mathematical concepts such as multivariable calculus if they did not exist in the natural world. It must be clarified that §2 does not claim man creates all knowledge they find; rather, man is the dictator over what is to become knowledge, insofar as their designed tools allow them to prove. This is why it must be said that man creates knowledge: they are their own limit to knowledge – their own measure.
Overall, if knowledge were natural and innate in humans, it is clear that P1 and P2 both should be able to view the forest similarly, yet they cannot. Though they see the same shapes and colors and creaturess, there is no unified thought across P1 and P2. This unified thought will remain absent until each is equipped with the same tools for interpretation; however, this tool has been shown to not be found in the natural world alone. Thus, the tool that allows unified thinking, or knowledge, must originate from man to understand the world around them. As it is left to man to develop and equip others with the tools necessary to hold what we believe to be knowledge, it then must be left to man to be a/the measure, as Protagoras refers to in his doctrine. Though man cannot create the reality he is faced with, he creates how he perceives it, thinks about it, responds to it, and desires to know it, creating a social construction of knowledge itself. Accordingly, it must be said as a result of §2 specifically, man’s creations are the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.
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To Fear, or not to Fear Death
It is crucial to the examination of whether or not one should fear death to first understand what they are examining. That is, one must first consider the question of what death is; this question, however, is a question that no human can answer truly. The answer to this question requires certainty – it requires knowledge – though one cannot be certain regarding what happens after death. Accordingly, one cannot rationally fear, or not fear, what they do not know; rather, they simply fear, or do not, the unknown in this case. With that in mind, there plainly cannot be a rational way to thus fear, or not to fear, death qua death, for one cannot come to know death qua death with certainty. With that said, there must become the necessary recognition and separation of equating the fear of the unknown to the fear of death itself; that is, one who is afraid, or who is not afraid of death must come to say they are, or are not afraid of the unknown, rather than of death itself.
Before beginning, two things must initially be clarified. First, within this essay there will be references to what will be called the social construct of death. By this term, it is not meant that death itself is a social construct and that people do not die; rather, what is meant by the social construct of death is that the idea of death, or of the afterlife, has been constructed socially via personal and cultural beliefs, such that it is based not on what happens after death – as we cannot be certain/knowledgeable of what does – but instead on what people may in fact desire the afterlife to be. More explicitly, it is the reflection of personal and cultural hope and uncertainty that have built society’s idea of what happens after death, not any sophisticated, empirical data. Second, the claim that knowledge requires certainty must be addressed. Within Plato’s Theaetetus, Thaetetus arrives at a definition of knowledge that will be used to back the claim that knowledge requires certainty. Within this dialogue, Theaetetus claims that knowledge is correct judgment accompanied by knowledge of differentness (P. 233 in Plato’s Complete Works, Edited by John M. Cooper; 210a-b). Looking specifically at this claim, it appears that correct judgment – where correct judgment is relating to factually correct information – must mean certainty. That is, one cannot judge something correctly unless they judge with certainty, for if they did not judge with certainty, they would be stating a belief rather than a fact. And in this case, if they state a belief – that is, to fail to use correct judgment – it cannot be knowledge according to Theaetetus. Thus, certainty must correspond to knowledge.
Now, looking at Daniel Korman’s “Don’t Fear the Reaper,” Korman claims that one should not fear death as they are unconscious after death, and thus, because they are unconscious, it is not bad for them. Further, he states that individuals are all human animals, and such that animals are unconscious when they are dead, humans must be as well. However, Korman’s argument is based on a fallacious string of reasoning. That is, Korman relies upon an unsupported view that animalism must be true – though he is necessarily assuming such is the case. When looking at the argument in its simplest form, yes, the human body is no longer functional and is unconscious after death; be that as it may, Korman cannot posit with certainty whether or not one – or an animal for that matter – has a soul, the possible separation of this soul from one’s body, whether the human soul lives on, if humans will experience reincarnation, nor a myriad of other metaphysical questions resulting from the end of one’s life on Earth, though he attempts to. In this sense, Korman’s claim of unconsciousness lies on a false assumption – an assumption grounded in an unsupported and necessarily uncertain view of animalism and the unknown metaphysical realm of life after death – and thus, his argument must necessarily be dismissed when considering whether or not one should, or should not fear death.
Furthermore, considering a different set of claims by David Beglin in “Fearing Death as Fearing the Loss of One’s Life,” the same problem occurs with regard to fearing death. Beglin argues that one has the ability to rationally fear death, insofar as death is concomitant to the loss of one’s agency and personal identity. He focuses his work largely on rationalizing the fear of death – or perhaps the death/end of one’s life as they know it – in individuals who have been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. This article, while taking a different shape than Korman’s, still attempts to provide a consequence of death. That is, in Beglin’s article, that one necessarily loses their agency and personal identity as a result of dying. Additionally, as a result of death, Berglin posits that people rationally fear that they will lose who they are and have been throughout their life, and thus, they will forever lose the ability to do/possess what they did/have found value in while on Earth. While this may be a fear that many possess, it should not be made into a fear of death; rather, this is a fear again rooted in the unknown. There is no certainty that someday after an Alzheimer’s patient leaves Earth, they will not be able to do and have what brings them joy again, nor is there any sort of absoluteness that anyone else who dies will too lose what they found value in indefinitely. This described behavioral trend/idea – the trend of attempting to make the unknown known, through the attribution of it to other possible outlets/explanations, for in this case, death – has become the genesis of the fallacious fear in the social construct of death. That is, it has led to the belief that what one does not know must necessarily be decided by death. Yet, there is no rational reason to believe that all unknowns have to be decided at the point of one’s death, except for the result of our surroundings, society, culture and traditions – the social construct of death.
Further, in Plato’s Apology, Socrates, while on trial faced with the possibility of being put to death, confronts this question of whether or not one should fear death. He responds that death for him is a good thing, and that those who believe death is a bad thing, or something to hold fear towards, are mistaken. He continues that there is a good hope of death being a blessing, such that it can be one of two things: either those who have died are nothing and unable to have any sort of perception, or their souls relocate from Earth to elsewhere (p. 35). Out of Korman and Beglin, this approach seems the most reasonable – that is, one can understand why someone would believe something of these sorts – though still not rational. Consider a scenario where a doctor told a patient they hoped – a pure hope – that a treatment plan they prescribed would cure a patient. There is one of two things that can happen in this scenario: the patient can either reject the doctor’s recommendation because it is based on hope with no true reasoning or basis for believing it would work, or the patient can put hope/trust into the alternative, being the doctor’s purely hopeful course of treatment, because they are in fear of what will happen if they do not. The latter is exactly what happens when considering the fear of death in today’s society; individuals cling to an idea of what death is because they are in fear of what death may be if they do not feel that they ‘know’ death. And as such, they put hope/trust/faith into an irrational course of action/beliefs, such as ones described by Korman, Beglin or even Socrates, that attempt to answer an unanswerable question out of pure hope to ease the mind of society, fueling the circular, false mythology of the social construct of death.
For the individual who asserts they ‘know’ death, one must assert back that what they have become acquainted with is not death in its truest form, but merely its social construct as they have never before died themselves. To the one who argues that people die and have been resuscitated, one must respond they got only a glimpse of what death may be; that is, one who sees a glimpse of a flower may see the color, the shape, petals or even the stem and leaves. In reality, though, they are left without seeing the majority of the flower: the flower’s roots, the function of the flower in nature with relation to other living things, the way the flower carries out its day-to-day functions, the biology of the flower and the meaning the flower has within society. For it is clear without understanding the flower as a whole, they cannot claim to know the flower. In the same sense, one who has died and been resuscitated can only be said to have seen a glimpse in their short time of death, and thus must not claim to know it wholly. In addition, for the one who holds no fear of death, one must plainly respond that they only tell themselves they have no fear, as what they are resisting to fear does not absolutely exist. Lastly, one may claim that this argument fails in the sense that it posits one should claim fear in the unknown, yet also claimed repeatedly, death itself is an unknown, so thus we are still saying we fear death. This claim is not wrong in the sense that the goal of the argument is to claim that death is the unknown; however, the entire premise of this paper is that because death is an unknown, one must simply say we fear the unknown and not death, as they are attempting to make death “known” by constructing it socially and claiming to fear it.
While this essay cannot be sure that the perspectives offered by anyone on the question of whether or not to fear death are absolutely wrong, the idea is that regardless of what one’s personal or cultural belief may be regarding the afterlife, there is no certainty. While socially constructing death’s outcome may bring comfort to those who behave in certain ways or believe certain things with respect to life after death, it cannot answer the why, the what, or the how. The why being why we should or should not fear death, the what being what death truly is, and the how being how one experiences death. Because of this, society must stop and recognize their fallacy of equating the fear of the unknown to the fear of death itself, they must come to accept that death does not absolutely decide what one does or does not know, and be able to be content with knowing they do not know death qua death. Until one understands this reality, will they ever understand that they will never be able to place or not place fear in death, but only fear, or not fear the unknown.
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Works Cited
Beglin, David. “David Beglin, Fearing Death as Fearing the Loss of One’s Life: Lessons from Alzheimer’s Disease.” PhilArchive, 1 Jan. 1970, philarchive.org/rec/BEGFDA.
Inwood, Brad, and L.P. Gerson . “Letter to Menoeceus: Diogenes Laertius.” Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, Second ed., Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997, pp. 28–31.
Korman, Daniel Z. “Daniel Z. Korman, Learning from Arguments: An Introduction to Philosophy.” PhilArchive, 1 Jan. 1970, philarchive.org/rec/KORLFA.
Preuss, Peter. Epicurean Ethics: Katastematic Hedonism. E. Mellen Press, 1994.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Consequentialism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 4 Oct. 2023, plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/.
A Critique of Ayn Rand’s A Virtue of Selfishness: Discovering the Virtue of Altruism
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A personal perspective on altruism and self-sacrifice
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We must condemn Ayn Rand’s Objectivist ethics’ denouncement of altruism and altruistic moral philosophy. Rand’s objection to altruist ethics lies in an ideologically skewed, egotistical and anthropocentric pseudo-reality, in which men and women ought to be the sole beneficiaries of their actions. As such, posited in her A Virtue of Selfishness, altruism “permits no view of men [or women] except as sacrificial animals and profiteers-on-sacrifice, as victims and parasites,” (Rand ix). Thus, to become virtuous in the eyes of Rand, one must contain the three virtues of reason, purpose, and self-esteem, along with their concomitant values of rationality, productiveness, and pride, respectively (Rand 27). While this paper will have its foundation built off the arguments of Rand, its overarching goal is to rebuke, or critique, her arguments through a reflection of my own experiential knowledge gained as a result of my community involvement, or altruistic behavior. I further contend and will aim to illustrate that altruism provides not only the ability to hold the mentioned virtues of reason, purpose, and self-esteem, but also the opportunity to develop a sense of reality, and a sense of spiritual growth. As such, we must not look through the lens of Rand’s pseudo-reality, and we must not become ignorant to the virtue of altruism.
When considering the virtue of reason, Rand believes it to be the source of rationality, or the ability to think; one must choose to use their thought – their conscience – in order to be virtuous, and they must choose to use it for their own benefit (Rand 25-27). What Rand fails to account for in this idea of rational selfishness is the problem of human posterity. In my own experience volunteering with St. John’s Breadline in Springfield, IL, there was not only the need for a large-scale altruistic commitment, but also the need to recognize that humans are struggling day-to-day who have no means of overcoming their hardships alone. These individuals who come through the breadline are often disabled, both physically and mentally, paraplegic, unable to communicate, ill, homeless, facing addiction, alone and have lost their families, been mentally abused, physically abused, are our nation’s own veterans, have been neglected and are unable to be helped by any other sort of governmental agency, have to work multiple jobs to support their families, and yes, even children come to eat at the breadline consistently. With this in mind, there is no possibility that any reasonable human would dismiss these individuals’ needs and label them as ‘parasites,’ ‘leeches,’ or even ‘moral cannibals’ feeding on the well-off population, such as Rand would. Without the presence of the breadline, some of these individuals would surely succumb to the effects of prolonged hunger; that is, we would choose to let our fellow humans die simply because we did not want to spend even three hours – a singular volunteer shift at the breadline – outside of our own egotistical fairyland. We must ask ourselves if this is truly the world we want to live in.
This experience at the breadline not only has shaped my view on the reality of the world outside of my own comfortable, and even privileged life, but it frightened me too. I truthfully did not want to go back after first volunteering; the other volunteer and I both had to be walked in and out to our cars as a safety precaution. However, I came to realize what is most important is that these individuals did not fail themselves. They were given no chance to succeed, often being born into non-sustainable home lives, facing debilitating or even terminal illnesses, and not given the opportunities a “successful” individual may have received growing up. This is not a matter of self-destruction or the conscious choice to pursue Rand’s anti-life; we as a society have failed them. When looking outside of Rand’s misguided lens, it is clear that by serving individuals faced with hardship, such as those who rely on the breadline for their next meal, we are thinking for ourselves – we are thinking for the next generations of humanity, and of our own families.
As for the virtue of purpose, Rand describes it as a quality in which an individual has a focus of productiveness. This said productiveness is further characterized by working towards reshaping the Earth to satisfy one’s own values, such that they must refrain from death. This is the central purpose of one’s life (Rand 29). Now, having volunteered a significant amount of time in the past year with the Animal Protective League (APL) in Springfield, IL, there is another angle we must consider towards understanding this described virtue of purpose. While perhaps just another animal shelter at first glance, the APL, through its staff and animals, has taught me more about satisfactory productiveness and its connection to altruism than any book, moral theory, opinion, or perspective could have. That is, you have to look deeper into why the staff do what they do there. On a daily basis, whether volunteers are present or not, staff take care of many animals and their needs, and they remain satisfied getting paid significantly less while carrying out far greater responsibilities than that of the average job. Throughout my months with the APL, never once have I met anyone who did not have a smile on their face or been full of kindness. Now, if Rand’s theory was correct, this happiness and satisfaction demonstrated by the APL staff, myself included, for the altruistic work we do would be considered a vice; however, is contentment of the soul not the end goal of a moral compass?
To get an even better understanding of the mindset of the staff, I was able to have a short interview with Mary Close, the Volunteer and Shelter Operations Coordinator at the APL. When getting to speak with her, one line of hers stood out to me. Ms. Close stated that it was by accident that she ended up at the APL, but if she could go back she would choose it over again in a heartbeat (Close). The work of staff members at the APL, such as Ms. Close, has spoken to me far louder of the value of altruism than any word offered by Rand. Through volunteering with the APL, it is plain that not everyone’s sense of productivity and needs are the same. There must be a consideration of people whose needs are met by acts of altruism through their own self-fulfillment. For these types of individuals, a life without working towards the greater good of society would be considered the anti-life. Although Rand may call this suicide, some may call it the deepest form of contentment, all-the-while still reshaping the Earth to meet their own values.
Finally, the virtue of self-esteem can be found in A Virtue of Selfishness as Rands states that pride, the result of self–esteem, can best be described as “moral ambitiousness,” meaning that one has reached the ability to “hold oneself as one’s own highest value by achieving one’s own moral perfection” (Rand 29). That is, moral perfection is conceived of in the sense that one is the only beneficiary of one’s own actions. By Rand, one necessarily must find pride in the holding of this quality. Prior to 2020 and into the spring of 2021 I was involved in Buddy Break, a respite program through my church that provided parents of special-needs children a break one day a month by pairing their child with volunteer “Buddies” and setting up activities for them to do together at the church. What always surprised me about these days volunteering for Buddy Break was the amount of joy the kids experienced while doing some of the simplest activities. I have come to believe this is rooted in the fact that kids with disabilities often do not have enough programs tailored to their needs, nor enough people willing to simply be with them, enjoy spending time with them, and accept them as they are. The activities and the one-on-one playful interactions meant a lot to them. Watching these kids become proud of themselves for accomplishing something they were scared or unsure of at first, like shooting a basketball in the hoop, making music, or even painting a pumpkin, gave me a real feeling of pride in the sense that I was able to help provide that opportunity for them. Thus, I strongly assert that pride too can accompany altruistic behavior.
I further sought to determine whether pride necessarily has to have a relationship with morality, as if it does, this would mean that altruistic behavior could be considered moral and to hold the described virtue of self-esteem. Reflecting back, whenever I would feel pride or a sense of satisfaction within myself while volunteering at Buddy Break, it was always when the children became happy or proud of themselves; and such, what always led the child to be proud of themselves was doing something that brought them pleasure or happiness. Thus, whether one considers themself a hedonist or non-hedonist, pleasure and happiness are considered to be the, or at least one of the indicators of morality. No matter what ethical guide one follows (action-based or virtue ethics), this sense of pride appears to be grounded in moral behavior. Thus, the Buddy Break program not only allowed me to understand the reality that children with special-needs face, but it allowed me to understand what pride and self-esteem truly are. Pride almost always is the result of performing a moral act in the mind of the actor. One can feel pride for acting as the beneficiary of their own action, such as the kids at Buddy Break, or as the result of altruistic behavior, such as in my case. Thus, I believe that my pride felt in this experience was the measure of moral behavior, and in this instance, the indication of the morality of altruistic behavior and the holding of Rand’s mentioned virtue of self-esteem.
It has become clear that one who finds those who practice altruism to be “self-destructive,” “profiteers on sacrifice,” “moral cannibals,” or “parasites” is one who is not acquainted with altruism itself. The one who fears altruism is the one who truly lacks self-esteem and faces a delusion that moral perfection is truly attainable. They confuse the virtue of purpose with having only one way of reaching self-fulfillment, and confuse reason with the idea that thinking for your own needs necessarily does not include the needs of others. For one who has experienced the effects on both sides of altruistic behavior knows that it is part of one’s spiritual journey towards finding truth in the world around them, as well as reaching the ability to know one’s own self. Altruism may in fact be a sacrifice, but it is a sacrifice aimed at a greater purpose. In the same sense that college is an investment in our future and some may be discouraged to attend college due to the short-term benefits of going straight into the workforce, altruism takes courage and commitment but what one finds at the end is necessarily that of contentment. I have found more than just reason, purpose, and a sense of pride and self-esteem in my journey of serving those other than myself. I have discovered the virtue of altruism. As Plato describes it in his allegory of the cave, I can see more than just the shadows. I can see past the egotistical ideology that shapes Rand’s pseudo-reality. I have obtained the ability to understand that individual human prosperity is just one aspect of our lives here on Earth. What matters is not that we all begin to live a life of pure altruism, for this would be unsustainable; rather, what matters is that we begin to see the morality and necessity of those who desire to and do live that life, or even a life consisting of a minimal level of altruistic behavior, in a way the Ayn Rand cannot. In the end, however, it is crucial that you do not take my ideas or experiences as absolute. That is, one must discover the virtue of altruism through their own experiences, on their own time, and in their own way.
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Works Cited
Close, Mary. Interview. Conducted by Jacob Pollock. 2 November 2023.
Rand, Ayn. and Nathaniel Branden. The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism. New York, New York. New American Library, 1964.
Biology versus Social Construction of Race and Ethics
The value of approaching race through virtue ethics
The influence of society on phenotypic uniqueness has long negated the biological study surrounding the similarities amongst races. Humanity itself has constructed the misguided notion that as one’s observable characteristics may differ, it necessarily follows that their whole genetic make-up must also be inconsistent. As this belief has evolved alongside humanity, it has developed into what is known as the social construction of race; that is, the artificial categorization of one’s counterparts based upon their visible character traits founded on inaccurate biological assumptions (McAfee).
What can be seen as a result of this social construction of race is a myriad of irrationally calculated, immoral behaviors consisting of ethnocentric and hierarchical ideology. These take the shapes of continued racially-based stereotyping and/or profiling, to Executive Order 9066 and the internment of Japanese Americans. The ability to shift from this fallacious social construction to the biological recognition of a singular genetically related human race lies in society’s capacity towards accepting virtue theory, or the belief that it is important not only to do the right thing, but to have the proper motivations, intentions, and emotions while doing it (Pojman and Fieser). Particularly, by accepting virtue theory, one aims at not only ending the behavior of phenotypic classification of races that action-based ethics may too conclude, but it furthers in an attempt to eliminate the racist, ethnocentric, and hierarchical ways of thinking, the root of the classification itself.
To fully develop and understand the argument put forth, one must first understand the biological contention. That is, there is no significant genetic difference between any currently established race, such that, for instance, two individuals of European descent may in fact be more genetically similar to an Asian individual than to each other (Chou). To arrive at this assertion, there are key biological components, such as epigenetics, alleles and the study of the geographical distribution of genetic variation, one must understand. Epigenetics are biochemical markers that, in short, have the ability to shut on or off genes. They can change the ways in which one’s genes are expressed, or shown, without making any true physical changes to one’s genetic code (McAfee). Alleles, on the other hand, are the different variations in a gene and are often determined by one’s epigenome. Alleles are the reason why humans all have different hair colors and textures while all of humanity has the same genetic code for hair (Chou). Now, as for the geographical distribution of genetic variation, found in a 2002 Stanford University study, only 7% of humanity’s alleles were specific to one region; and of this 7%, the median relative-frequency of these region-specific alleles were found only in about 1% of the population (Rosenberg et al.) Thus, while races may tend to look different on the outside, it is clear that there is little – if any – genetic uniqueness amongst them.
Now, as race can be scientifically shown not to be determined biologically, this must mean that it is the development of a social construction and the result of geographic and environmental uniqueness. Accordingly, there now comes the need to unpack its concomitant effects. Less than two centuries ago, Mr. Aarons-Young, a slave, was awoken as his ‘master’ barged in the door. He was told he and his fellow slaves had not been productive enough the previous day, for which they were all whipped, one-by-one. Grieving in pain, clenching his teeth and his jaws shaking, Mr. Aarons-Young fought to stay upright. Before losing consciousness, the last thing he remembered was his ‘master’ yelling, “What’s de matter wid you, n*****, don't it hurt?” (Aarons-Young). What happened to Mr. Aarons-Young is a direct result of society’s hierarchical and ethnocentric ideology gained as a result of phenotypic racial classification.
It is more necessary now than ever to remedy this unethical behavior as a result of the social construction of race. That is, although in Mr. Aarons-Young’s case slavery itself may not be legal anymore in the United States (US), there is one aspect that remains lingering within the US population: racism, the root of slavery itself. For many decades after the abolishment of slavery, segregation and the Jim Crow era took place; however, society, or at least a significant population of it, felt they had already remedied the problem by ending slavery. This is because of following, or the indirect influence of action-based ethics, such as Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology. A utilitarian in response to the end of slavery would claim that they provided the greatest good for the largest number of people by ending slavery, and thus could stop there – or they would have deemed slavery ethical in the first place. A deontologist would say they universalized and followed the maxim that “one ought not to own humans,” because it violates their dignity as rational beings, and would too stop at this ethical notion. Thus, only the virtue ethicist would continue past the abolishment of slavery in their search for ethicality. They must necessarily seek the equality of others out of their desire for proper motivations, just intentions, and to rid themselves of emotions of unfairness; that is, they desire good at its root.
Considering the virtue ethicics’s argument, in the first section of Book II of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes what it means to be virtuous. Focusing on character virtue, he believes that it is unnatural and no one is born with any inclination to act virtuously; rather, one becomes virtuous by habitual and repetitive behavior of virtue (Aristotle 1744). Focusing on historic human behavior, what this means is that humans have simply formed the wrong ethical habits, such that they do not focus on anything but the consequences of their actions, or their duty to act, or in the case of this essay, simply allowing the passive acceptance of biologically unique races to exist within their minds. Now, the remedy to this social construction lies in inward reflection; and such, this is why racism still exists today. This is why the social construction of race exists; why people become ethnocentric and hierarchical thinkers; why one develops dogma. The greater society does not give serious thought to their own habits. If we continue to fail as a society to reflect inward on ourselves, more unethical behavior, such as underlying forms of racism, will necessarily result from the social construction of race.
In the fourth section of Book II in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle further asserts that individuals must not simply seek to behave virtuously, but to behave in matters as virtuous individuals (Aristotle 1507). That is, one who does an act must not do it because it is right, they must do it because they desire to do what is right. Consider the example of Mr. Aarons-Young, and imagine there is a twist to the story; imagine there was a passerby who witnessed his ‘master’ whipping him and his fellow slaves. While if the passerby was a utilitarian or deontologist and viewed this as unethical treatment, they may hesitate for a variety of reasons to stop it, but in the end, may well choose to intervene. This is what Aristotle would claim is behaving virtuously. On the other hand, if the passerby was a virtue ethicist, they would immediately see the immorality and step in to stop the behavior without a second thought. Thus, the passerby would have the pure intention to stop the behavior, not just to do what is morally correct. This is what Aristotle would describe as behaving as virtuous individuals. Accordingly, society needs the unalloyed intention of the passerby who follows virtue ethics to combat ethical dilemmas, such as those that develop as a result of the social construction of race.
In the large majority of cases, though, action based ethics has come to the right decision surrounding race in the end. As mentioned earlier, slavery did end. In addition, Japanese Americans did get released and compensated by the US government; the Nazis in World War II were stopped; the US civil war ended up reuniting the nation and produced a nation perhaps more ethically sound afterwards. However, following virtue ethics these events never would have happened in the first place. Yes, slavery ended, but why did it need to happen in the first place for our society to believe it was wrong to own human beings? Why did we need to experience the detrimental effects of World War II to recognize the value of Jewish lives? Was there no other way to fix the problem of racism and slavery in the US than to have a civil war killing millions of citizens? Again, we fall back to the failure to reflect on our own habits that have led to the social construction of race and its destructive behaviors, the core focus of virtue ethics by Aristotle. Thus, the effects of the social construction of race may end in time too, but new ones will continue to arise until we look at our own habits. One must ask themselves if they want to continue to harm lives, or focus on the root of the problem itself and prevent them from occurring to begin with by following virtue ethics.
The continuation of phenotypic racial classification is thus embedded in both biological ignorance and self ignorance. One must question how many more global wars on ‘race,’ how many more killings, or how many more times individual ‘races’ will be the target of oppression before society will look back at itself. By following virtue ethics, society could have prevented past and present atrocities that have taken place as a result of the social construction of ‘race,’ such as described by Mr. Aarons-Young. What is most important, however, is stopping further harm in the future. As such, society must now separate from action-based ethics, and accept virtue ethics and its attempt to eliminate the root of today’s injustices surrounding established ‘races,’ ethnocentrism, hierarchical racial ideology, and racism itself.
Works Cited
Aarons-Young, Charlie. “Image 88 of Federal Writers’ Project: Slave Narrative Project, Vol. 1, Alabama, Aarons-Young. Library of Congress.” Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/resource/mesn.010/?sp=52.
Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume Two : The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton University Press, 1984. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uis/detail.action?docID=1632631.*
Chou, Vivian. “How Science and Genetics Are Reshaping the Race Debate of the 21st Century.” Figures by Daniel Utter, Science in the News, Harvard Kenneth C. Griffin Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 27 Feb. 2019, sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/science-genetics-reshaping-race-debate-21st-century/.
Guerrero-Bosagna, Carlos. “What Is Epigenetics? .” TED-Ed, Youtube, 27 June 2016, www.youtube.com/watch?v=_aAhcNjmvhc.
McAfee, Sarah. “Race Is a Social Construct.” Center for Health Progress, 19 July 2021, centerforhealthprogress.org/race-social-construct/#:~:text=That’s%20why%20we%20say%20race,tool%20for%20oppression%20and%20violence.
Pojman, Louis P. & Fieser, James (2017). Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 8th edition. Boston: Cengage.
Rosenberg, Noah A., et al. “Genetic Structure of Human Populations.” Science, vol. 298, no. 5602, 20 Dec. 2002, pp. 2381–2385, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1078311.
The United States Healthcare System: Systemic Racism and Discrimination Towards American Minorities
Editor's Pick in Columbia University’s 2023 Voices in Bioethics writing contest
Editor's Pick in Columbia University’s 2023 Voices in Bioethics writing contest___
Abstract:
This paper examines the structural barriers that prevent millions of Americans—primarily minorities—from accessing healthcare, emphasizing the link between poverty and the lack of universal health insurance. A key argument is that the uninsured crisis in the U.S. is not merely a byproduct of economic inequality but a direct consequence of historical and systemic racial discrimination. The largest concentrations of poverty among minority populations are found in the Southern United States, where the legacy of slavery and segregation has led to generational economic disadvantage. This economic hardship is the primary reason why individuals remain uninsured, with 64.2% of uninsured nonelderly adults citing affordability as the main obstacle. Despite this, the U.S. government has failed to implement a universal healthcare system, reinforcing racial and economic disparities. The consequences of this systemic neglect are severe: higher rates of chronic illness, maternal mortality, and preventable deaths among Black and Hispanic populations, particularly in states with the highest poverty rates. Applying Mill’s Utilitarian framework, this paper argues that the failure to provide universal healthcare is not only an extension of institutionalized racism but also an unethical policy decision that prioritizes political ideology over the well-being of millions. Addressing this crisis requires dismantling false consciousness—the societal illusion that poverty and lack of insurance are personal failings rather than the result of deeply entrenched structural inequities. By acknowledging the intersection of poverty, race, and healthcare in the U.S., this paper calls for a shift toward policies that prioritize equity and access, ensuring that healthcare is recognized as a fundamental human right rather than a privilege dictated by wealth and race.
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Today, United States citizens live in a society guided by a false consciousness. The presiding culture of the United States (US) has painted a picture – a distorted and surreal mythology – that continues to be admired. This picture is characterized by conservative dogma and intolerance within the political, economic, and ideological spheres of society, leaving individuals unable to ascertain truth. US citizens are provided the inability to see reality for what it is, and instead encouraged to live by a means of pseudo-reality as described by Debord. As a result, many US institutions, including the prison system and the healthcare system, have become platforms of masked discriminatory and racist practices within today’s world of “colorblindness.” The right to universal health care represents yet another opportunity for US institutions to deploy covert and underlying racist and discriminatory tactics, and continues to remain largely unacknowledged by non-minority citizens of the US, contributing to significantly higher rates of untreated health concerns and concomitant higher death rates in US minority populations.
To understand this assertion, it is important to start by examining the ways in which the US prison system acts as a discriminatory and racist institution. Today, African Americans, Hispanics, and other minorities account for roughly 40% of the US population, yet they comprise around 60% of the US’ total incarcerated population (Harris and Lieberman). That is, they are disproportionately represented amongst the incarcerated. To put this in perspective, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, nearly “one in every 15 African American men [become] incarcerated, as opposed to only one in every 106 white men” (Harris and Lieberman). Looking back to the early 1970s when Black Americans were making progress in obtaining civil rights, there was a substantial increase in the number of incarcerated Black individuals, acting as a “stealth counterweight to political and economic progress” (Harris and Lieberman). Thus, prisons were used as a means to suppress the growing success of Black individuals, furthering the disproportionate number of incarcerated minorities.
The prison system is not the only institution within the US that deploys underlying discriminatory, exploitative, and racist tactics towards American minorities. For example, there have been mortgage lending procedures that have “disproportionately exposed minority borrowers to the risky subprime loans that triggered the financial collapse of 2008 and widespread foreclosures in minority communities” (Harris and Lieberman). Also discovered have been numerous obscure tax and insurance policies that have targeted neighborhoods with substantial minority populations (Harris and Lieberman). There are many more examples of US institutions exploiting and discriminating based upon race, yet minority groups cannot simply avoid these tactics; that is, taking out loans and paying taxes can be essential life tasks for most individuals. Thus, as society continues to be governed by a false consciousness, true reality will indefinitely remain uncertain. This becomes clear, as even today there have been minimal studies regarding the exploration of this institutionalized racism (Harris and Lieberman).
As it is clear numerous institutions have and continue to behave in discriminatory ways, it must be considered that the US’ lack of a nationwide right to health insurance represents another means of discrimination based upon race. While at this point in the essay a discussion of the history of slavery within the US may seem extraneous, the lasting effects of slavery continue to play a key role in discrimination towards minorities, contributing to diminished resources for health insurance for minorities in the US. To understand the role of slavery in decreased access to nationwide health insurance, one must come to see the foremost factor as to why individuals do not carry it. That is, “in 2022, 64.2% of uninsured nonelderly adults said they were uninsured because coverage is not affordable, making it the most common reason cited for being uninsured” (Drake and Tolbert). As for the role of long-term effects of slavery, minorities, especially Black Americans, face far greater poverty than their counterparts, predominantly in places where there is a stronger connection to slavery in the past (O’Connell). Thus, as it is commonly understood the southern half of the US to have experienced the largest impact from slavery, this would indicate the largest impact on poverty struggles as a result of slavery would be in the south. Coincidentally, as one might say, “reflecting geographic variation in income and the availability of public coverage, most uninsured people live in the South” (Drake and Tolbert).
As Black Americans have faced substantial struggles with poverty due to the lasting effects of slavery and previously exploitative southern economies, bearing in mind the primary reason for not carrying health insurance is a lack of funds, it is plain that past discrimination and racism of yesterday has set the stage for wealth and health disparities and discrimination today. That is, the “average wealth of white households in the United States [has become] 13 times as high as that of Black households” (Harris and Lieberman). To further put this problem into context, minorities “made up 45.7% of the nonelderly US population but accounted for 62.3% of the total nonelderly uninsured population” (Drake and Tolbert). Looking at minorities other than Black Americans, the uninsured rate for “nonelderly Hispanic (18.0%) and American Indian and Alaska Native people (19.1%) are more than 2.5 times the uninsured rates for white people (6.6%)” (Drake and Tolbert). Moreover, of the uninsured population, most of the 25.6 million nonelderly uninsured adults were from minority groups (Drake and Tolbert).
As posited, Black Americans and other minority groups’ inability to afford health insurance has been created by US citizens themselves, through past legality and support of slavery, leaving lasting effects that have made health insurance unaffordable. In return, some US citizens and their government have failed to remedy the situation, choosing instead to endorse the idea that minorities lack funds to carry health insurance by arguing they are ‘lazy,’ ‘unmotivated,’ or ‘irresponsible.’ In doing so, US citizens have further engaged in the stereotyping of minority groups as inferior through their inability to obtain health insurance. Consequently, through an unfair health insurance access system, US society has maintained a discriminatory attitude towards minority groups. Once there is a determination of a belief of inferiority, a blind eye will indefinitely turn away from discrimination within society’s governance of the false consciousness, leaving its citizens unable to ascertain reality, chiefly developing and supporting their own self interests. Thus, through the contribution and failure to remedy the poverty struggles inflicted on minority groups, including those inflicted on Black Americans largely through the past slavery in the southern US, minority groups, making up 62.3% of all uninsured nonelderly adults, have been made into the problem by society. These individuals have been labeled, ideologically transformed into ‘inferior beings’ per conservative dogma, and thus become further discriminated against with respect to their inability to obtain health insurance in the US.
Considering the ethicality of the lack of a nationwide right to health insurance, one must take the stance of Mill’s Utilitarianism, which revolves around providing the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people through consequence of action (Mill). First, it is clear by failing to provide a national right to health insurance, the U.S. is leaving indigent, uninsured groups, largely consisting of minorities, to find the means to fund their own insurance. This may contribute to higher and disproportionate crime rates of minority groups out of need for survival and fulfillment of basic human needs; to institutionalized racism; to false ideologies; to stereotypes wrongly placed upon minority groups; and to untreated illness. The resulting human tragedy is seen in myriad situations: minority woman facing high maternal death rates in childbirth, uninsured minority individuals being turned away from hospitals who only take those with insurance, silent suffering and untreated illnesses including high rates of diabetes and heart disease, and more recently, higher death rates and worse outcomes for minorities as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (Tai).
Thus, as the result of a non-existent nationwide right to health insurance, the US is plainly failing to provide the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people and therefore, per Mill, the failure to provide a national right to health insurance is clearly unethical. The lack of national access for all individuals to health insurance is not only an underlying form of racism and discrimination towards American minorities, but it is unethical as well. To address this, American society must alter its picture of the distorted and surreal reality that has been painted, and shatter its lens of the pseudo-reality that shapes many individuals’ view of the world. That is, there becomes the need for a higher form, or a deeper level, of collective experiential consciousness in order for a symbiotic relationship to occur – a relationship advantageous to all simultaneously – in the biological and sociological realms. Only then can the trend of institutionalized racism and discrimination be broken, and as a part of this, only then can all individuals receive access to health insurance and related healthcare that would improve their quality of life.
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Works Cited
Debord, Guy. The Society of the Spectacle. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, Zone Books, 1995.
Drake, Patrick, and Tolbert, Jennifer. “Key Facts about the Uninsured Population.” KFF, www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/.
Harris, Fredrick C., and Lieberman, Robert C.. “Racial Inequality After Racism: How Institutions Hold Back African Americans.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 2, 2015, pp. 9–20. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483477.
Little, Daniel. “False Consciousness.” False Consciousness, www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~delittle/iess%20false%20consciousness%20V2.htm.
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. London, Parker, Son, and Bourn, 1863. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <www.loc.gov/item/11015966/>.
O’Connell, Heather A. “The Impact of Slavery on Racial Inequality in Poverty in the Contemporary U.S. South.” Social Forces, vol. 90, no. 3, 2012, pp. 713–34. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41682675.
Tai, Don Bambino Geno, et al. “Disproportionate Impact of Covid-19 on Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups in the United States: A 2021 Update.” Journal of Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities, U.S. National Library of Medicine, Dec. 2022, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8513546/#:~:text=Black%2C%20Latinx%2C%20and%20American%20Indian,children%20in%20a%20worrying%20trend.