Fall 2024 Semester Portfolio

Included are three essays written this semester which I believe both demonstrate my individual philosophical growth and are relevant to modern philosophical questions

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• Epicurus On Fate: Decision Making and Katastematic Pleasure

  Ancient Greek Philosopher Epicurus, when it comes to decision making, claims it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way in his Letter to Menoeceus. However, this is inconsistent with his subscription to katastematic hedonism. This contradiction as a result of his claim on fate is analyzed within the the text.

• Protagoras’ Man is the Measure Doctrine: The Truth of Knowledge

  Protagoras’ Man is the Measure Doctrine states that man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not. This doctine’s possible meanings are explored, specifically with regards to human knowledge, within Plato’s Theaetetus.

• To Fear, or Not to Fear Death

  As the title hints, this essay attempts to answers the question of whether or not one should, or should not fear death. Through a variety of readings and authors, the position is taken that one ought not live in fear of death, as one cannot come to know death itself prior to dying.

Epicurus On Fate: Decision Making and Katastematic Pleasure

In Diogenes Laertius’ preservation of Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus, on the notion of fate, claims it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way. That is, it is better for a favorable decision not to turn out right in action than for a poor/careless decision to turn out right because of chance, or unintentionally (Inwood & Gerson 31). Going forward within this essay, it is necessary to understand the ideas of eudaimonia and katastematic pleasure. Eudaimonia will be defined as the general characterization of the highest good. On the other hand, katastematic pleasure is a form of pleasure in which there is a persistent and undifferentiated state; this state includes feelings of tranquillity, the absence of want or unsatisfied desire, and resistance to pain and anxiety; it can be contrasted with kinetic pleasure, or strictly physiological pleasure based upon movement/change. Epicurus and the Epicureans held that katastematic pleasure is the way of achieving eudaimonia, or the highest good. When considering the Epicurean viewpoint that eudaimonia is a life of sustained katastematic pleasure, there is disagreement stemming from Epicurus’ claim on fate. Specifically, if one is to only seek out katastematic pleasure to reach eudaimonia, it is unclear as to why one would not embrace the poor or careless act or decision if it leads to more pleasure, regardless of if it is by chance. It is thus both inconsistent and incompatible for Epicurus to claim that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way while also subscribing to katastematic hedonism — a life in search solely of katastematic pleasure. This inconsistency/incompatibility takes the shape of making the Epicureans’ consequentialist form of ethics — where what is ethical is concomitant to katastematic pleasure — objectivist — where the outcome is irrelevant and one must always pick the good act regardless of outcome.

To begin, it is necessary to break down and understand Epricurus’ claim on fate. Within his Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus is writing to Menoeoceus to provide practices which lead towards living the good life, or towards reaching eudaimonia. These practices include having devout feelings towards the gods, having no fear regarding death, having reasoned out the natural goal of life, calculating the reasons for and against each choice, and knowing the limits of both good and bad things. When breaking each of these practices down, there are two things worth noting. First, Epicurus is not focused on these acts in themselves. That is, Epicurus is not concerned with the gods qua the gods, or death qua death; rather, Epicurus is only concerned with the gods or death inasmuch as their concern leads towards reaching eudaimonia — he is concerned with the outcome of being concerned. Second, all of these acts center around the individual. Specifically, each individual must have a relationship with the gods or not fear death for the impact that is to be had on them only. These practices laid out by Epicurus leave each individual capable of being their own rational agent; it allows the individual to develop their own reasoning as to why having a relationship with the gods will fill their life with katastematic pleasure.

Now, before ending the letter, Epicurus brings up the idea of fate. Particularly, Epicurus asserts that one ought to refrain from becoming a slave to fate, and must seek to remain autonomous (Inwood & Gerson 31). Epicurus follows this with his claim on fate: that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way. To understand this claim, it is necessary to circle back to the practices Epicurus mentions in order to reach eudaimonia. For instance, recall his assertion of the necessity of having a relationship with the gods. By the fate claim, Epicurus believes it is better for one to rationally seek a relationship with the gods for its foreseeable and anticipated pleasure, and in the end, find no pleasure, than to not develop a relationship with the gods, and on the off chance, experience pleasure. It seems to Epicurus that by following this practice, one is thus foreseeably more likely to reach eudaimonia through rational calculation, and accordingly, it is compatible with and the best way of practicing katastematic hedonism in order to reach eudaimonia.

Specifically, in terms of ethically good and bad acts, Epicurus is attempting to say that choosing the bad act — if the outcome of both the good and the bad act are unknown — is wrong, insofar as it is not foreseeably as likely to produce a katastematicly pleasurable outcome proportional to the good act. In this sense, an Epicurean would assert that the fate claim is compatible with the Epicurean subscription to katastematic hedonism because the ethical/good act is always assumed to bring the most pleasure; that is, Epicurus’ claim on fate is still a form of consequentialist ethics as the good act is only as good as its pleasurable outcome.

While Epicurus’ claim on fate may seem reasonable at first glance, it nevertheless gives room to the rise of an ethical incompatibility. Particularly, it gives rise to an objective ethical principle within the midst of a necessarily consequentialist form of katastematic hedonism. To develop an understanding of why this is, it is necessary to define objective vs. consequential ethics, as well as hedonism. Objective ethics provide a moral guideline through principles; that is, it is always wrong to kill, or it is always wrong to lie. Consequential ethics concern the agent with the consequence of each action. For instance, it is okay to kill Jane if Jane is planning to kill five other people, or it is okay for Jane to lie if it will help save the lives of three people in danger. Hedonism, on the other hand, is the belief that pleasure is the first innate good. Thus, a hedonist may develop a moral compass in search of what brings them pleasure; that is, an act is virtuous for the hedonist insofar as it has an outcome of pleasure. For this reason, as hedonism is focused on the outcome of an act rather than a basic principle, it is the root of a consequential form of ethics.

Recalling the practices Epicurus describes for Menoeceus to achieve eudaimonia, these acts are good to the extent that they provide the agent with a form of pleasure as a result of performing them; they are focused on the sole value of pleasure, thereby hedonistic, and are good, ethical, and virtuous due to their outcome, so by that, consequentialist as well. Now, as for Epicurus’ fate claim — that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way — it can be broken down into two objective ethical principles. First, one must act as a rational agent; and second, one must always choose the act that appears more rational as a result of their being a rational agent. Because one can break this claim down into objective principles that entirely lack concern for the outcome of each action, it is ethically objective and is no different than saying, for example, one must never kill. Therefore, in this case, an act is better ethically if the outcome is not pleasurable so long as one acted rationally per Epicurus. However, this goes entirely against Epicurean consequentialism, and as a result, becomes the antithesis of katastematic hedonism.

To now put this ethical incompatibility into perspective, consider the example of a social justice advocate. By speaking out on issues important to this advocate, they will foreseeably receive a lifetime of katastematic pleasure, and thus by katastematic hedonism, this behavior is entirely ethical. Now, as a result of speaking up, consider a scenario where this individual is imprisoned, or even worse, killed; however, being imprisoned or killed will inevitably cause this advocate unforeseen suffering, as they are no longer able to spread awareness on the issues that are important to them. Per Epicurus’ claim on fate, it is better for the advocate to be imprisoned or dead, being the unlucky result of a good action, than to have abstained from this behavior and experienced more pleasure in the long run; meanwhile, however, the overarching goal of the Epicurean is to experience as much katastematic pleasure as possible. Thus, the fate claim is advocating entirely against katastematic hedonism; it is advocating for short-term pleasure, if advocating for any pleasure at all. This is why the objective nature of Epicurus’ fate claim is simply incompatible ethically with Epicurean hedonism; there are two conflicting guidelines to follow when seeking to act virtuously.

Once understanding how Epicurus’ claim on fate creates an ethical incompatibility, it is necessary to further challenge and develop the ways in which the claim on fate is antithetical to Epicurean hedonism. The argument against Epicurus and the Epicureans will now be laid out. If an individual has both option P and option Q, where P is the “good” act and Q is the “bad” act, it seems on the surface level that one should, without hesitation, choose option P for its anticipated pleasure. This, alongside the Epicurean, is agreed upon. However, if it happens once that an individual chooses option Q, and this action ends up leading to its own katastematic pleasure, it would seem compatible with the Epicurean belief in obtaining eudaimonia that when left to fate, the bad act may not always be wrong to choose inasmuch as it has once provided a sense of pleasure. It would then still be inconsistent with katastematic hedonism to objectively claim it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way, if being lucky has previously resulted in more katastematic pleasure.

On these grounds, the Epicurean must respond that if Q, the bad act, becomes foreseeably more pleasurable than P, the good act, then Q becomes the good act, and P the bad act, and it is thus still compatible with katastematic hedonism to always choose the good act when left to fate. Yet, to the Epicureans it must be said that if in time the bad act can become the good act, then it is even less reasonable to always choose P knowing that Q can — and has for that matter — as a result of time, become the good act itself. It is on these grounds foolish by Epicurus’ claim to choose either act to the extent that in this case both P and Q are left to chance due to their possible shift in “goodness.” Accordingly, the fate claim remains incompatible with katastematic hedonism because it would mean always choosing P, when always choosping P would mean missing out on pleasure once — not if but when — the bad act becomes the good act.

Backing Epicurus, one must respond that it is impossible for Q to become the good act insofar as no one will experience Q, as they will always choose P in accordance with Epicurus’ claim on fate, and accordingly, Q would never become the good act in the first place. However, in response to this, not one Epicurean has to experience Q themself to find pleasure more foreseeable in Q. Consider an individual who has been eating bread everyday to satisfy their hunger. Now, consider an instance where this individual watches someone else who had eaten bread everyday too, eat steak, and proceed to rave about how good the steak was afterwards. In this instance, that individual who had eaten bread everyday may have their desire for steak sparked due to a newfound foreseeable pleasure, in the same sense that one who watches another find pleasure in Q, the opposite of P, may then have a rational temptation towards Q themself without ever having experienced it. By continuing to choose P, the “good” choice, in this instance, it will lead to the opposite of katastematic pleasure. Consider a second example in which an Epicurean living in a community with other Epicureans trips and breaks their arm. As a result, the Epicurean is told not to do their daily chores for the community and to get rest. Another Epicurean witnesses this situation and sees the result of the first Epicurean. Would it not seem reasonable for this second Epicurean — assuming they want to get out of their daily work too — to try and break their arm — act Q — for the foreseeable katastematic pleasure resulting from not doing their chores? It is clear that one does not need to experience Q themself to foresee pleasure in Q; and now, with the desire of Q unfilled, they can no longer find katastematic pleasure in P. Epicurus’ claim that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way thereby remains incompatible with the Epicurean belief in katastematic hedonism being the truest form of eudaimonia, as one who follows this claim limits their reasonable search of the greatest form of katastematic pleasures.

At best, by following Epicurus’ fate claim, one can be said to develop a sense of objective consequentialism. That is, they are focused on an objectively probable cause: by choosing P, the good act, they are objectively more probable to receive katastematic pleasure (Sinnott- Armstrong). However, this still necessarily takes away from the particular individual’s ability to foresee their own pleasure in outcomes, doing away with the true subjective form of consequentialism that is fundamental to katastematic hedonism — as not everyone receives the same pleasure from the same things. By taking away the subjective nature of consequentialism in the case of the Epicureans, it also takes away their ability to be a rational agent, as they are unable to think in terms of pleasure for themselves, but only through an objective sense; thus, by the objective consequentialism stemming from Epicurus’ claim on fate, one is left with the option of being either unlucky or lucky, both in an irrational way, making it absurd not to seek out being lucky, and thus pleasurable. In the end, regardless of the way one approaches Epicurus’ claim that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way, it remains the antithesis of the Epicureans’ way of obtaining eudaimonia as a result of its concomitant ethical incompatibility.

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Protagoras’ Man is the Measure Doctrine: The Truth of Knowledge

In Plato’s Theaetetus, Theaetetus claims that knowledge is perception. Socrates takes this assertion to mean that, if Theaetetus’ claim is true, Protagoras’ man is the measure doctrine is correct; namely, that man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not (152a, Plato, Complete Works). While Socrates applies this doctrine to the assertion that knowledge is perception, it is inappropriate not to question whether this is the meaning Protagoras had in mind. Accordingly, there are two additional interpretations one should consider. First, Protagoras may have meant that what man is, is simply a measure against what man is not (interpretation §1). That is, by comparing what one is to what one is not, one can know what they are as they know what they are not – i.e. what is, is, simply because it is not something else. Secondly and more convincingly, however, it appears Protagoras could be implying all knowledge is synthetic, or created by humans themselves (interpretation §2). While this interpretation appears to claim knowledge is perception in a different form, what is meant is that humans are using their own creations – their language, their cultures, etc. – to interpret or to perceive, such that without their own creations,  there could be no knowledge. One’s interpretations therefore lie in a synthetic, man-made foundation equipping individuals with the ability to interpret and thus, to know. As such, the way society uses these tools allows individuals to create, or know what is, thus becoming their own measure. If this latter interpretation of Protagoras’ ‘man is the measure doctrine’ is correct, knowledge is nothing more than a social construct. That is, knowledge could not truly exist outside of one’s own idea of knowledge, as knowledge would only be obtainable through synthetic means and not reachable through the natural world itself.

Now, within the Theaetetus, the overarching goal of the dialogue is to understand and determine what knowledge is. Within Theaetetus and Socrates’ conversation, they arrive at the definition of knowledge as perception, ultimately subscribing to Protagoras’ man as the measure doctrine to back their claim. The belief in favor of this doctrine is as follows: because everyone experiences things differently, such as the temperature in a room, everyone has their own individual truths. These truths are incontrovertible; one cannot argue or be argued with whether they felt cold or hot. Thus, absolute truth is contingent only upon the observer’s interpretations, becoming the measure of themselves and the world as they know it. For Socrates and Theaetetus, this doctrine, as well as the claim that knowledge is perception, follows the idea of subjective relativism, or the idea that all facts are true for an individual and only one individual. Accordingly, if something is true perceptually, it must be considered knowledge.

As the approach taken by Thaetetus and Socrates on the interpretation of the man is the measure doctrine is now clear, its approach concerning §1 and §2 requires further exploration. For the purposes of this essay, there are three components to be fulfilled when examining the doctrine. First, one must be a/the measure in any interpretation of the doctrine. Second, one must be able to determine what is and what is not, and third, there must exist one’s actual knowledge of what is and what is not. In order for §1 and §2 to appear correct, these components must be fulfilled.

When initially approaching §1, it can be shown to meet the mentioned prongs for correct interpretation of the doctrine. That is, one is provided the ability to determine what is and what is not, through the method of taking what they are not away from what they are (satisfying prong two). Once performing this subtraction of oneself from oneself, one is left with knowing what is, namely, what they are (satisfying prong three). Now, it should be said that what one is, is what makes up one’s life as they know it. For instance, one is a doctor, a parent, or a family member. These things can be broken down further, such as into an oncologist, a father, or a cousin, respectively; and these can be broken down again, perhaps into a pediatric surgical oncologist, a father of three, or a cousin of Jim, for example. Once one knows what they are on a larger scale – from taking away what they are not from what they are – they can continue to break down these components to understand what is on a smaller scale. If we continue to break down the oncologist, we may arrive at the point of an individual who surgically removes masses of cells whose cell cycle checkpoints no longer stop cell division, causing them to multiply uncontrollably. Now, how do we know that a cell cycle checkpoint is, one might respond. We know that a cell cycle is, because it is what the doctor is. Thus, man becomes not only a measure of themselves, but of everything that is, originating in understanding what one is from looking at what they are not – entirely from §1. As man has been shown to be a/the measure as a result of §1, it has met all three prongs in order to become a plausible interpretation of the doctrine.

Looking now at §2, it too can be shown to meet all three prongs laid out. To distinguish between what is and what is not, one uses the tools – i.e. their language, culture, etc. – they have been provided with that have been created by others. Consider two people; let one of them be part of a contemporary society such as ours today (P1), and the other to have been secluded from society, having never had anyone around them but themself (P2). Consider a scenario where both of these individuals are walking through a forest. As P1 walks through, they are able to distinguish what is from what is not, while P2 cannot do so, though they are seeing the same things. If they continue to walk through the forest each day, while in time P2 would begin to observe the different shapes, sizes, or colors of the things in the forest around them, they have no reason to conclude anything is different from anything else, or that everything is not one. Thus, it is not until human creation, such as a language, shared culture, or shared belief comes into play that one is able to distinguish what is from what is not, or in this case, what is many from what is one, producing what today we would call knowledge. Therefore, P2 could walk through the forest everyday for the entirety of their life and find no such thing as what we would call knowledge in the natural world; for knowledge is simply what one calls using these human-created tools in a specific way – a way to distinguish what is from what is not – such that without them, P2 can never hold knowledge.

As humans have a way to determine what is as a result of their creations, they too know as a result of them. That is, P1 knows the differences of the trees from the bushes not because they have an innate idea that they are not the same thing outside of their appearance, but because humans have begun to call them different things. They know, as that is what their language says is the case; because of attaching their symbol, or meaning, to an object; and because of the way in which their culture uses these languages/symbols to guide them to what they believe to be knowledgeable or true in the world around them.

Take now into account that of numbers and mathematics – something which one may often claim to be an innate form of knowledge. Recall P2 and their experience walking through the forest. It is important to first note that P2 would have no reason to call two adjacent trees by the number 2, as 2 is simply a symbol we use to illustrate the idea of ‘two,’ which they would not know. Accordingly, these man-made symbols, such as language and numbers can be said to influence the way one thinks. Without knowing these numeric symbols, P2 would have no reason to think in terms of the number of trees they see; there would be no innate force driving P2 to distinguish whether or not the two trees they saw were one or many. Thus, while mathematics appears to be a form of incontrovertibly true and innate knowledge, it is rooted in man-made symbols that influence the way one interprets and thinks of the world around them.

As children are raised from a young age to think dichotomously – for instance, in terms of 1 or 2 or 3, or of one or many – they are being raised to think in terms of society’s idea of knowledge; thus, it must be said that our knowledge is simply a form of social dogma – a socially constructed absolute. One free from this dogma, however, cannot be said to hold its knowledge. Therefore, P2, free from these man-made symbols and languages, must not have knowledge as we know it. On the other hand, though, one who holds these synthetic tools of distinction – of which allow man to become a/the measure of themselves and the world – must be said to have some form of knowledge of what is and what is not, satisfying both prongs one and three of a correct interpretation of the doctrine.

Though both interpretations have been shown to meet the three criteria for correct interpretation, it is necessary to look at potential flaws. Two points are presented for consideration. First, §1 presupposes that one is able to distinguish what something/someone is not; however, individuals' realities may become mixed with their desires. That is, one’s desire to be wise may influence them to believe they are wise. As this is left up to the individual's pure, reason-based assessment, it appears flawed, leading man to be an inaccurate measure. Consequently, it appears one must subscribe to §2. Secondly, however, many people will say that §2 is wrong because humans cannot make up knowledge surrounding things so small such as, for example, atoms or mathematical concepts such as multivariable calculus if they did not exist in the natural world. It must be clarified that §2 does not claim man creates all knowledge they find; rather, man is the dictator over what is to become knowledge, insofar as their designed tools allow them to prove. This is why it must be said that man creates knowledge: they are their own limit to knowledge – their own measure.

Overall, if knowledge were natural and innate in humans, it is clear that P1 and P2 both should be able to view the forest similarly, yet they cannot. Though they see the same shapes and colors and creaturess, there is no unified thought across P1 and P2. This unified thought will remain absent until each is equipped with the same tools for interpretation; however, this tool has been shown to not be found in the natural world alone. Thus, the tool that allows unified thinking, or knowledge, must originate from man to understand the world around them. As it is left to man to develop and equip others with the tools necessary to hold what we believe to be knowledge, it then must be left to man to be a/the measure, as Protagoras refers to in his doctrine. Though man cannot create the reality he is faced with, he creates how he perceives it, thinks about it, responds to it, and desires to know it, creating a social construction of knowledge itself. Accordingly, it must be said as a result of §2 specifically, man’s creations are the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.

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To Fear, or not to Fear Death

It is crucial to the examination of whether or not one should fear death to first understand what they are examining. That is, one must first consider the question of what death is; this question, however, is a question that no human can answer truly. The answer to this question requires certainty – it requires knowledge – though one cannot be certain regarding what happens after death. Accordingly, one cannot rationally fear, or not fear, what they do not know; rather, they simply fear, or do not, the unknown in this case. With that in mind, there plainly cannot be a rational way to thus fear, or not to fear, death qua death, for one cannot come to know death qua death with certainty. With that said, there must become the necessary recognition and separation of equating the fear of the unknown to the fear of death itself; that is, one who is afraid, or who is not afraid of death must come to say they are, or are not afraid of the unknown, rather than of death itself.

Before beginning, two things must initially be clarified. First, within this essay there will be references to what will be called the social construct of death. By this term, it is not meant that death itself is a social construct and that people do not die; rather, what is meant by the social construct of death is that the idea of death, or of the afterlife, has been constructed socially via personal and cultural beliefs, such that it is based not on what happens after death – as we cannot be certain/knowledgeable of what does – but instead on what people may in fact desire the afterlife to be. More explicitly, it is the reflection of personal and cultural hope and uncertainty that have built society’s idea of what happens after death, not any sophisticated, empirical data. Second, the claim that knowledge requires certainty must be addressed. Within Plato’s Theaetetus, Thaetetus arrives at a definition of knowledge that will be used to back the claim that knowledge requires certainty. Within this dialogue, Theaetetus claims that knowledge is correct judgment accompanied by knowledge of differentness (P. 233 in Plato’s Complete Works, Edited by John M. Cooper; 210a-b). Looking specifically at this claim, it appears that correct judgment – where correct judgment is relating to factually correct information – must mean certainty. That is, one cannot judge something correctly unless they judge with certainty, for if they did not judge with certainty, they would be stating a belief rather than a fact. And in this case, if they state a belief – that is, to fail to use correct judgment – it cannot be knowledge according to Theaetetus. Thus, certainty must correspond to knowledge.

Now, looking at Daniel Korman’s “Don’t Fear the Reaper,” Korman claims that one should not fear death as they are unconscious after death, and thus, because they are unconscious, it is not bad for them. Further, he states that individuals are all human animals, and such that animals are unconscious when they are dead, humans must be as well. However, Korman’s argument is based on a fallacious string of reasoning. That is, Korman relies upon an unsupported view that animalism must be true – though he is necessarily assuming such is the case. When looking at the argument in its simplest form, yes, the human body is no longer functional and is unconscious after death; be that as it may, Korman cannot posit with certainty whether or not one – or an animal for that matter – has a soul, the possible separation of this soul from one’s body, whether the human soul lives on, if humans will experience reincarnation, nor a myriad of other metaphysical questions resulting from the end of one’s life on Earth, though he attempts to. In this sense, Korman’s claim of unconsciousness lies on a false assumption – an assumption grounded in an unsupported and necessarily uncertain view of animalism and the unknown metaphysical realm of life after death – and thus, his argument must necessarily be dismissed when considering whether or not one should, or should not fear death.

Furthermore, considering a different set of claims by David Beglin in “Fearing Death as Fearing the Loss of One’s Life,” the same problem occurs with regard to fearing death. Beglin argues that one has the ability to rationally fear death, insofar as death is concomitant to the loss of one’s agency and personal identity. He focuses his work largely on rationalizing the fear of death – or perhaps the death/end of one’s life as they know it – in individuals who have been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. This article, while taking a different shape than Korman’s, still attempts to provide a consequence of death. That is, in Beglin’s article, that one necessarily loses their agency and personal identity as a result of dying. Additionally, as a result of death, Berglin posits that people rationally fear that they will lose who they are and have been throughout their life, and thus, they will forever lose the ability to do/possess what they did/have found value in while on Earth. While this may be a fear that many possess, it should not be made into a fear of death; rather, this is a fear again rooted in the unknown. There is no certainty that someday after an Alzheimer’s patient leaves Earth, they will not be able to do and have what brings them joy again, nor is there any sort of absoluteness that anyone else who dies will too lose what they found value in indefinitely. This described behavioral trend/idea – the trend of attempting to make the unknown known, through the attribution of it to other possible outlets/explanations, for in this case, death –  has become the genesis of the fallacious fear in the social construct of death. That is, it has led to the belief that what one does not know must necessarily be decided by death. Yet, there is no rational reason to believe that all unknowns have to be decided at the point of one’s death, except for the result of our surroundings, society, culture and traditions – the social construct of death.

Further, in Plato’s Apology, Socrates, while on trial faced with the possibility of being put to death, confronts this question of whether or not one should fear death. He responds that death for him is a good thing, and that those who believe death is a bad thing, or something to hold fear towards, are mistaken. He continues that there is a good hope of death being a blessing, such that it can be one of two things: either those who have died are nothing and unable to have any sort of perception, or their souls relocate from Earth to elsewhere (p. 35). Out of Korman and Beglin, this approach seems the most reasonable – that is, one can understand why someone would believe something of these sorts – though still not rational. Consider a scenario where a doctor told a patient they hoped – a pure hope – that a treatment plan they prescribed would cure a patient. There is one of two things that can happen in this scenario: the patient can either reject the doctor’s recommendation because it is based on hope with no true reasoning or basis for believing it would work, or the patient can put hope/trust into the alternative, being the doctor’s purely hopeful course of treatment, because they are in fear of what will happen if they do not. The latter is exactly what happens when considering the fear of death in today’s society; individuals cling to an idea of what death is because they are in fear of what death may be if they do not feel that they ‘know’ death. And as such, they put hope/trust/faith into an irrational course of action/beliefs, such as ones described by Korman, Beglin or even Socrates, that attempt to answer an unanswerable question out of pure hope to ease the mind of society, fueling the circular, false mythology of the social construct of death.

For the individual who asserts they ‘know’ death, one must assert back that what they have become acquainted with is not death in its truest form, but merely its social construct as they have never before died themselves. To the one who argues that people die and have been resuscitated, one must respond they got only a glimpse of what death may be; that is, one who sees a glimpse of a flower may see the color, the shape, petals or even the stem and leaves. In reality, though, they are left without seeing the majority of the flower: the flower’s roots, the function of the flower in nature with relation to other living things, the way the flower carries out its day-to-day functions, the biology of the flower and the meaning the flower has within society. For it is clear without understanding the flower as a whole, they cannot claim to know the flower. In the same sense, one who has died and been resuscitated can only be said to have seen a glimpse in their short time of death, and thus must not claim to know it wholly. In addition, for the one who holds no fear of death, one must plainly respond that they only tell themselves they have no fear, as what they are resisting to fear does not absolutely exist. Lastly, one may claim that this argument fails in the sense that it posits one should claim fear in the unknown, yet also claimed repeatedly, death itself is an unknown, so thus we are still saying we fear death. This claim is not wrong in the sense that the goal of the argument is to claim that death is the unknown; however, the entire premise of this paper is that because death is an unknown, one must simply say we fear the unknown and not death, as they are attempting to make death “known” by constructing it socially and claiming to fear it.

While this essay cannot be sure that the perspectives offered by anyone on the question of whether or not to fear death are absolutely wrong, the idea is that regardless of what one’s personal or cultural belief may be regarding the afterlife, there is no certainty. While socially constructing death’s outcome may bring comfort to those who behave in certain ways or believe certain things with respect to life after death, it cannot answer the why, the what, or the how. The why being why we should or should not fear death, the what being what death truly is, and the how being how one experiences death. Because of this, society must stop and recognize their fallacy of equating the fear of the unknown to the fear of death itself, they must come to accept that death does not absolutely decide what one does or does not know, and be able to be content with knowing they do not know death qua death. Until one understands this reality, will they ever understand that they will never be able to place or not place fear in death, but only fear, or not fear the unknown.

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Works Cited

Beglin, David. “David Beglin, Fearing Death as Fearing the Loss of One’s Life: Lessons from Alzheimer’s Disease.” PhilArchive, 1 Jan. 1970, philarchive.org/rec/BEGFDA.

Inwood, Brad, and L.P. Gerson . “Letter to Menoeceus: Diogenes Laertius.” Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, Second ed., Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997, pp. 28–31. 

Korman, Daniel Z. “Daniel Z. Korman, Learning from Arguments: An Introduction to Philosophy.” PhilArchive, 1 Jan. 1970, philarchive.org/rec/KORLFA.

Preuss, Peter. Epicurean Ethics: Katastematic Hedonism. E. Mellen Press, 1994. 

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Consequentialism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 4 Oct. 2023, plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/.