Neurolaw: A New Approach to Normativity based on Teleology

——

Abstract:

The evolving field of neurolaw raises critical questions about the intersection of neuroscience and legal justice, particularly in assessing criminal responsibility and ethical considerations. This paper explores the implications of neurolaw through the lens of Sheppard v. Davis (2020), a case highlighting the role of mental illness in legal culpability. Despite extensive psychiatric evaluations revealing severe mental health conditions, Sheppard was sentenced to capital punishment, illustrating the limitations of the current legal framework in considering neuroscientific evidence. This paper argues that integrating neurolaw into U.S. courts is essential for fostering a fair, equitable, and just legal system—one that acknowledges the complex relationship between brain function and criminal behavior. However, such integration must be carefully managed to avoid ethical pitfalls, such as eroding moral agency or establishing problematic legal precedents. Drawing on John Rawls’ distinction between rationality and reasonableness, this paper contends that a teleological shift toward rehabilitation, rather than mere punishment, is necessary for an improved legal framework. Ultimately, neurolaw presents a transformative opportunity to align legal practices with contemporary understandings of human cognition, ensuring a justice system that is both principled and humane.

——

When considering the teleology of today’s legal sector, the overall aim, in a most general sense, has been ensuring justice and societal well-being; however, the development and implementation of neurolaw, the attempt at understanding the relationship between law and the brain, has raised the question of what is legal justice when taking into account new neuroscientific research (Petoft, 2015). Neurolaw is asking questions related to how one’s brain may influence criminal responsibility, play into mental health law, introduce new possible realms of tort law, or affect free will in legal contexts (Petoft, 2015). For the sake of this essay, a case, Sheppard v. Davis (5th Cir. 2020), will be used to break down neurolaw’s new teleological legal structure of normativity. The breakdown of this case will hone in on what neurolaw could mean for both mentally ill offenders of the law moving forward, as well as the US population writ large with regard to contemporary ethics. As a result of this analysis concerning Sheppard v. Davis, it is contended that the further development and usage of neurolaw within US courts is crucial towards reaching the most fair, equitable and just legal system possible; however, it is just as, if not more crucial, that this implementation of neurolaw within US courts abide by a very fine line to avoid negative ethical ramifications affecting the US population as a whole.

To begin, it is necessary to first break down the case of Sheppard v. Davis. At age 19, Erica Sheppard assisted another individual (person P) in the murder of a mother with two children (person M). Sheppard, after first breaking into M's apartment, proceeded to tackle and hold down M and watched as P cut her to death (Sheppard v. Davis, 2020). Unarguably, the crime appears worthy of capital punishment, which is what Sheppard received; however, it remains necessary to understand the mental state of Sheppard prior to, and when committing these acts, regardless of how gruesome the crime may have been.

After the crime, Sheppard was evaluated by multiple psychiatrists. Following two specific psychiatric evaluations — one being a twelve, and the other an eighteen hour evaluation — there were significant findings on Sheppard’s mental state. It was determined that Sheppard suffered from severe Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, and dissociative disorder; she was found to have the mental-age equivalence of a fourteen year old, likely only able to respond to stimulus in a non-thinking manner rather than as a reasonable adult (Sheppard v. Davis, 2020). It follows that Sheppard would be extremely vulnerable to manipulation. Growing up, it is also relevant to note that Sheppard was subject to being almost beaten to death by her mother, forced to perform oral sex repeatedly between 3-5 years old, faced domestic abuse, admitted to hearing voices in her head, and was raped numerous times, once even at knifepoint (Sheppard v. Davis, 2020).

Now, it must be said that while gaining an understanding of Sheppard's background ought not relieve her of criminal responsibility entirely, it is crucial when determining the correct punishment for rehabilitation purposes here. That is, her background under these circumstances is entirely relevant towards reaching the most fair, equitable and just punishment possible; thereby, it is also relevant towards reaching the most fair, equitable and just legal system. To understand the role of neurolaw on fairness, equity and justice, per their varying definitions and usages in today’s world, it is important to first understand the meaning of these terms as used in this essay. For a legal system to be fair, it will take into account/consider all things needed to have an equitable legal system. As for an equitable legal system, it is one that goes beyond giving everyone the same opportunity; it ensures equal chance for an equal outcome for all. The difference here between fair and equitable is that pure fairness merely adopts principles of what it means to be equitable, but an equitable legal system ensures its equity. Lastly, legal justice is reached when, and only when, a legal system is both fair and equitable, ensuring holistic review for every case presented before it. The ways in which these qualities are enhanced by the implementation of neurolaw within US courts and their impact on future offenders will now be expanded upon.

When considering how neurolaw ensures a more fair legal system, we must circle back to Sheppard’s case. Here, we are looking largely at principle; that is, what the principles of her case are that influenced the ultimate decision of her execution, and how these principles would have differed per neurolaw’s influence. When deciding to deny Sheppard’s appeals and to carry out her execution, the court stated all of the evidence regarding Sheppard’s mental state was “merely cumulative,” meaning it was an unnecessary amount of evidence pointing towards one conclusion (Sheppard v. Davis, 2020). Simply put, the findings regarding Sheppard’s mental state were not viewed as necessary to take into consideration by the court, as the conclusion was seemingly obvious. This, however, is not a fair principle; the evidence here was not cumulative insofar as the true extent to which Sheppard experienced mental illness was never actually determined. For if the evidence were indeed cumulative, Sheppard would not have been executed per the sake of rehabilitation; it would not be impossible to rehabilitate Sheppard with reasonable precautions in as much as her mental state influenced her actions. Cumulative documents in this case would have demonstrated just how poor and unstable her mental condition truly was. All of this evidence should have been taken into consideration. The need to consider evidence regarding the relationship between law and one’s brain must be principally established for a fair legal system to exist. Thus, the role of neurolaw in ensuring this relationship is adequately considered will undeniably produce a more fair consideration of the why, both within Sheppard’s, as well as other offenders’ cases moving forward.

Concerning equity, the principles necessary for fairness must be enforced in a way such that each individual has an equal chance at the same outcome. In this case, once understanding neurolaw’s primary principle — adequately examining the relationship between one’s brain and the law — one must now ascertain how this principle can be used and enforced to create the most equitable legal system. When answering this question, one must specifically determine the weight of mental health disability on criminal and civil guilt/liability to perceive how to properly implement neurolaw’s key principle with respect to rehabilitation purposes. To this end, the teleology of the neurolaw’s new legal structure of normativity is, and must be rehabilitation. That is, neurolaw aims to no longer focus on justice or societal well-being as its ends; rather, it factors in questions of justice and societal well-being in deciding on rehabilitation strategies for the individual. Rehabilitation is neurolaw’s end. One must then ask when dealing with mental illness on criminal and civil guilt/liability what the best way to rehabilitate an individual is with resources available. Neurolaw thus presents as a tool that does not get side tracked when dealing with mental illness on how gruesome a crime may be. While Sheppard’s crime was gruesome, one’s focus must remain on rehabilitating her, not merely punishing her per society’s influence. This is the aim of fairness neurolaw promises for all, thereby establishing additional means of equitable practice. Accordingly, neurolaw is necessary to the enforcement of an equitable legal system.

In combination with both the more fair and more equitable legal systems possible through the implementation and usage of neurolaw, we arrive at the conclusion that neurolaw will ultimately produce a more just legal system per the definition of justice. As mentioned prior, this implementation, however, must follow a very fine line. This line will now be our focus.

When distinguishing the acceptable line of neurolaw’s influence, there are specific questions that arise. Largely, questions transpire regarding what neurolaw may mean for the US population at large. That is, how might one remain a moral agent if, in time, neurolaw develops a new, universally accepted standard concerning one’s behavior and mental illness? This line of questioning directly leads into neurolaw’s influence on contemporary ethical theories. That is, for instance, what could neurolaw mean for moral absolutes, or per deontological ethical theories, moral obligations that cannot be overridden. Might neurolaw set a benchmark that there are no moral absolutes if the courts weigh one’s mental health too highly? Will it be found that one cannot be responsible for their actions as a result of mental illness? Or could it be that neurolaw sets an infinite amount of moral absolutes by distinguishing one normative “neurological correctness” with regard to the brain and one’s actions? Will there still be a need for contemporary ethical theories as a result of neurolaw’s findings/usage?  It is clear that there are many questions left unanswered regarding the scope of neurolaw and its role in one’s acting as a moral agent, many of which hold the power to give rise to significant negative consequences for the US population at large; however, the governing line of neurolaw is reachable.

To understand this line it is necessary to look towards political philosopher John Rawls. In his book Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls makes the distinction between what is rational and what is reasonable. In this distinction, Rawls states that to be rational is to behave sensibly or understandably; comparably, to behave reasonably is to behave in a manner that is morally justified, fair, intrinsically just, and to the benefit of the public (Rawls & Kelly, 2003). For instance, an individual who robs a gas station is behaving rationally, as one may be able to understand why he robbed a gas station; however, this act is not reasonable, as the robber’s behavior is not morally justifiable. Concerning neurolaw, Rawl’s theory will draw the governing line based on reasonableness. While one can rationalize the vast possibilities of neurolaw, by acting in such a way that Rawls distinguishes as reasonable, one is forced to act both in the best interest of the US public, and for the sake of morality qua morality. One is thus ethically not permitted to adopt a teleological structure of normativity based on ends; one is not permitted to adopt a system like the one that executed Erica Sheppard. This system, as was previously uncovered, is not as fair, equitable, or as just as it necessarily should have been. Because there has demonstrably been a possibility of a more fair, equitable and just legal system, reason will inevitably guide one to reaching the described system of proper usage. Reasonableness thus demonstrably promises neurolaw’s ideal structure of normativity based on a teleology of rehabilitation.

As a result of the reflection of neurolaw’s influence, it is clear that once uncovering, grasping, and ensuring the governing line of reasonableness as per Rawls, neurolaw promises a more fair, equitable and just normative legal structure based on teleology. Insofar as this new normative structure’s teleology moves away from usings means, such as justice and societal well-being, as misleading end goals, it can center in on rehabilitation as its true end. This shift both inevitably and undeniably promises a better outcome for offenders, such as Erica Sheppard, as well as the US population as a whole. It ensures a moral compass based on the betterment and growth of both its society and its offenders. Accordingly, neurolaw’s necessity has been demonstrated.

References

Petoft A. (2015). Neurolaw: A brief introduction. Iranian journal of neurology, 14(1), 53–58.

Rawls, J., & Kelly, E. (2003). Justice as fairness: A restatement. WRMS. 

Sheppard v. Davis, no. 18-70011 (5th cir. 2020). Justia Law. (n.d.). https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/18-70011/18-70011-2020-07-22.html